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PREFACE 
The work programme of the Public Administration Branch of the United Nations 
Secretariat includes a project on administration for development planning and plan 
implementation. An inter-regional meeting of experts on the subject was held in 
Paris, France, from $ to 19 June 1964, and the report of the meeting was issued as 
document ST/TAO/M/27. 
This paper was prepared by Professor Bertram M. Gross at the request of the 
Public Administration Branch. It will also be presented as a basic paper for the 
Tenth Session of the ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning, 
which is to be devoted to the administrative aspects of economic development 
planning. 
Professor Gross is Chairman of the Executive Committee, International Group 
for Studies in National Planning (INTERPLAN); Editor of the National Planning 
Series, Syracuse University Press; Professor of Political Science and Director of 
the National Planning Studies Program, Maxwell School, Syracuse University; former 
Executive Secretary of the President's Council of Economic Advisers and first 
Chairman of the National Capital Regional Planning Council in the United States of 
America. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily 




1. "One of the characteristics of being human," writes Arnold Toynbee, the 
British historian-philosopher, "is that one makes plans". 1/ Another, to para-
phrase the famous lines of Robert Burns, is that the well-laid plans of men, even 
more than of mice, "aft gang agley". 
2. In this second half of the twentieth century, mankind's noblest and most 
human effort has been the making of plans by the governments of pre-industrial 
societies 2/ in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America to escape the 
clutch of colonialism, injustice, poverty, disease, hunger, ignorance and despair. 
Indeed, the planners 3/ in these countries - national leaders, administrators and 
technicians - have set themselves the high objective of attaining the benefits of 
industrialization based on science without suffering the recurring depressions, the 
exploitation of the underprivileged and the staggering corruption that characterized 
industrial growth in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This objective 
comprises nothing less than a far-reaching social transformation, the building of a 
new society. Above' all, the planners want to attain their goals in a few decades, 
not a few centuries. The number of countries led by these planners is growing and 
can be expected to continue to grow until it includes nearly every low-income 
nation in the world. 
1/ Arnold J. Toynbee, America and the World Revolution (New York and London: 
Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 3. 
2/ The term "pre-industrial" is much more appropriate than "under-developed", 
which carries invidious connotations. In any case, it is used primarily to 
refer to societies that are industrially under-developed. Similarly, "indus-
trializing" is much more descriptive than "developing", since it indicates the 
direction of development in the pre-industrial societies of Asia, the Middle 
East, Africa and Latin America. Many of the highly industrializing societies 
are, indeed, developing at a more rapid pace, but towards "post-industrialism". 
This subject is discussed in greater detail in The State of' the Nation: Social 
Systems Accounting by Bertram Gross in Raymond A. Bauer, ed., Social Indicators 
(Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966) and Space-Time and Post-Industrialism by 
B. Gross, CAG Occasional Paper, 1966. 
3/ The term "planners" is here used to refer not only to planning technicians (who 
under some circumstances seem to regard themselves as the only planners, even 
if their role is limited to making proposals), but also top plan administrators 
and national leaders. This terminological problem is discussed at greater 
length in chapter I. 
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A. Gaps between plans and performance 
3. The plans of these administrators are no exception to the general rule that 
there are usually great gaps between the goals of man and their attainment. Many 
development plans, indeed, are not very "well laid". They may be little more than 
symbolic ritualism or Utopian dreaming. They may often consist of proposals with-
out commitments, programmes without interrelationships, projections without pro-
jects, and projects without resources. Plans that are achieved may turn out to be 
overly modest or else strategic errors that waste scarce resources. Even those 
plans that are the best conceived and implemented will invariably contain compo-
nents that work out unsatisfactorily. 
4. Thus, in reviewing development planning in over 100 countries, Albert 
Waterston comes to the following conclusion: 
"... even when the intangible values of planning are taken into account, an 
examination of postwar planning history reveals that there have been many 
more failures than successes in the implementation of development plans, ... 
The record reveals that among less-developed countries only a very few have 
succeeded in more or less consistently achieving reasonable plan targets over 
a period of a decade or more." 4/ 
In a similar vein, it is reported by the United Nations that "the actual growth in 
income and output of the developing countries during the first part of the nineteen-
sixties has generally not been sufficient to offer assurance that the target of the 
Development Decade will be reached." 5/ In Asia, according to a report of the 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), "the rates of economic 
growth generally recorded in the ... region in the early sixties had, in fact, 
fallen' short not only of the planned targets, but also of the growth rates of the 
1950's." 6/ 
B. The need for general "principles" 
5. The industrializing nations have nevertheless learned much about development 
planning that should serve them well in the future. Indeed, hidden by a host of 
cultural and terminological differences, there is even an emerging consensus on 
certain administrative aspects of national development in planning. This consensus 
is implicit in the practices of the more effective planning systems and the 
4/ Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1 9 6 5 ) , pp. 2 9 3 , 2 9 6 . 
5/ United Nations, "Problems and Policies in the Development Decade," chapter 1 in 
World Economic Survey. 1964 (Sales No.: 65.II.C.2), p. 8. 
6/ United Nations, Report of the Conference of Asian Economic Planners, Bangkok, 
1 9 6 4 ( E / C N . 1 1 / 6 7 3 ) , p. 3 . 
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thinking of the more successful planners. It has been made increasingly explicit 
in the growing tody of expert reports on economic development and public adminis-
tration that have been prepared under the auspices of the United Nations, its 
regional commissions and specialized agencies. It is being developed by the small 
but growing body of empirical studies on the realities of national planning. 7/ 
6. Yet much still remains to be done in the explicit formulation of administra-
tive principles bearing on planned economic development. In public administration 
generally, there has been a serious lag in the formulation of prescriptive prin-
ciples. During the first part of the twentieth century under the leadership of 
such great pioneers as Henri Fayol, Frederick Taylor, Lyndall Urwick and Luther • 
Gulick, certain so-called "classic" principles of administration were formulated. 
Then came a period of great disillusionment, as people learned that many of the 
earlier generalizations were too narrow, too formalistic, and something less than 
realistic. Herbert Simon attacked many of the older principles as homely proverbs, 
myths, slogans, pompous inanities and "terms not unlike those used by a Ubangi 
medicine man to discuss disease". 8/ Regarding public administration theory as 
7/ Among the more empirically-oriented studies of Asian experience in national 
economic planning, special mention should be made of the following:: A,H. 
Hanson, The Process of Planning: A Study of India's Five Year Plans, 1950-
1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); Mahbub U1 Haq, Strategy'of 
Economic Planning: A Case Study of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
1963); John P.' Lewis, Quiet Crisis in India (Washington: Brookings Institution, 
1962); Louis J. Walinsky, Economic Development in Burma, 1951-1960 (New York: 
Twentieth Century Fund, 1962); and Albert Waterston, Planning in Pakistan 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), and Development Planning: Lessons of 
Experience, op. cit. On a world-wide scale the National Planning Series of the 
Syracuse University Press has already led to the publication of the following 
volumes in 1965 and 1966: John Friedmann, Venezuela: From Doctrine to 
Dialogue; Douglas E. Ashford, Morocco-Tunisia: Politics and Planning; Fred G. 
Burke, Tanganyika: Preplanning; Robert J. Shafer, Mexico : Mutual Adjustment 
Planning;1 Benjamin Akzin and Yehezkel Dror, Israel:' High Pressure Planning; 
Everett E, Hagen and Stephanie F.T. White, Britain: O.uiet Revolution in Plan-
ning: and Joseph LaPalombara, Italy: The Politics of Planning. Future 
volumes are in process on many other countries. 
8/ Herbert A, Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. xiv. 
The contributions' of the early pioneers, including Max Weber and the new 
approaches developed by Simon and many others are summarized in "The Pioneers: 
The Gospel of Efficiency" (chapter 6) and "The Pioneers: New Beginnings" 
(chapter 7) in Bertram M'. Gross, The Managing of Organizations, 2 vols. (New 
York: Free Press, 1964). 
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suffering from the disease of premature prescription, Simon and his associates 
prescribed their own medicine in the form of large doses of "value-free" positivism 
and identification of administration with decision-making. 9/ This medicine, taken 
even by many who protested against it, led to a narrowing down of administrative 
theory to small and unrelated propositions, to declining interest in the environ-
mental aspects of public administration and to escapism from the great issues 
facing public administrators at the higher levels of national responsibility. As a 
result, there have been too few bold and imaginative efforts to develop modern 
principles that can be tested and reformulated so as to contribute to a emulative 
process of extending our knowledge of administrative processes. 
7. The major objective of this paper is to promote the synthesis of certain 
realistic "principles" - on the basis of the vague consensus already existing - on 
the administrative aspects of economic development planning. The following chapters 
therefore, will set forth a series of propositions, or principles, dealing with 
(a) The interdependence of planning and administration (chapter I) ; 
(b) Certain major aspects of plan implementation: strategic guidelines 
(chapter II), obstacles (chapter III), and operating principles ; 
(chapter TV) 
( c) Machinery for planning (chapter V); and 
(d) Central-regional-local relations (chapter VI). 
The entire set of propositions (twenty-five in all) is based not only on empirical 
studies of national planning, but upon the author's personal experience, observa-
tions, and discussions in various countries. They represent a major extension 
beyond the analytic-descriptive propositions presented in Action under Planning 10/ 
9/ In his earlier work, particularly in his collaboration with Donald Smithburg 
and Victor Thompson in the writing of their jointly-authored Public Adminis-
tration (New York: Knopf, 1950), Simon deals with decision-making as one aspect 
of administration. Subsequently, because of his personal interest in studying 
cognitive processes, he has written as though the entirety of administration 
could be understood from the deci'ion-making viewpoint. It is interesting to 
note that while more impressionable people have been misled by this over-narrow 
approach, his own former collaborator, Victor Thompson, has sharply pointed out 
its inadequacies in Modern Organization (New York, Knopf, 1961). 
10/ B„ Gross, ed. Action under Planning: Essays in Guided Economic Development (New 
York: McGraw Hill, 1966). The essays in this volume are based on papers 
presented at an international conference in July 1964 sponsored by the Compara-
tive Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration. In 
unrevised form these essays were circulated separately as Occasional Papers 
among the international membership of the Comparative Administration Group, 
- 5 -
and "National Planning: Findings and Fallacies." 11/ Even in this earlier work 
the effort was made to utilize whatever aspects of modern administrative theory 
(including decision-making theory, communication theory, organization theory, human 
relations and "administrative science" or "management science") may be relevant to 
development planning. In this paper, with its much greater emphasis upon prescrip-
tive principles, greater use has been made of modern "systems analysis" -
particularly in the more human form of the "social systems accounting" approach set 
forth as a conceptual framework for planning in "What Are Your Organization's 
Objectives? A General Systems Approach to Planning" 12/ and The State of the 
Nation. 13/ 
8. All these "principles " must be considered as "starting points", not' "end 
points", and more as questions for future exploration than as final answers. If 
they are of any current use to national leaders, plan administrators and planning 
11/ B. Gross, "National Planning: Findings and Fallacies" in Public Administra-
Review, December, 1965> pp. 263-273. This article attempts to summarize 
empirical research on national planning through the development of the 
following analytic-descriptive (but not prescriptive) generalizations: (a) 
The perception of imminent crisis is usually a necessary (although not 
sufficient) condition for the emergence of national planning; (b) National 
planning, while an alternative to unplanned market competition, is itself a 
form of structured competition; (c) Established plans are often a serious 
obstacle to planning; (d) Planning for resource acquisition tends to take 
precedence over planning for resource utilization, particularly in the earlier 
phases; (e) Long-range planning has proved valuable mainly as a guide to 
current action; (f) Entirely apart from their technical contributions, 
economics and econometrics play important social roles in planning; and (g) 
To the extent that it actually affects economic behaviour, national planning 
involves the guidance of many changes in the structure and performance of 
social systems. 
12/ B. Gross, "What Are Your Organization's Objectives? A General Systems Approach 
to Planning," in Human Relations, August, 1965.» pp° 195-216. 
13/ B. Gross.' The State of the Nation: Social Systems Accounting, in Raymond A. 
Bauer, ed. Social Indicators. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), and 
published separately by Tavistock Publications, London (in press). Popular 
applications of the social systems approach to national planning in the United 
States are outlined in B. Gross, "The Social State of the Union'.', Trans-Action. 
November/December 1965.» pp. 14-17, and "Let's Have a Real State of the Union 
Message'^ Challenge, May/June 1966. 
( 
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technicians, it is only as "currently useful generalizations". 14/ To be more 
useful, moreover, each of these propositions requires far more extensive develop-
ment. Thus an entire paper, manual or book would be required merely to spell out 
the different kinds of combinations hinted at - let alone the corollary proposi-
tions - in the principle that "The power to achieve significant progress can be 
obtained only through some combination of centralization and decentralization." 
Indeed, in the space available, the treatment of all the propositions must 
necessarily be more suggestive than definitive. 
9. When stated without much supporting detail, many of the generalizations will 
appear obvious, as might be expected when both practice and research provide the 
basis for an emerging consensus. On the other hand, each of them also stands out 
in sharp contrast from certain widespread ideas and practices which have seriously 
interfered with effective development planning and implementation. These misleading 
"proverbs" of development administration will be specifically identified as falla-
cies, myths and illusions, since an effort is needed to reduce their influence or 
modify them, if not replace them completely with more realistic generalizations. 
10. It would also be a dangerous illusion, however, to think that any such 
general statements, even when developed in greater detail than appears in the 
following chapters, could possibly provide automatic, prefabricated solutions to 
any of the practical problems faced by national planners, any more than the theo-
ries of physics and engineering can by themselves provide blueprints for a bridge. 
14/ The phrase "currently useful generalization" was first introduced by l.'esley 
McNair, Professor of Marketing at the Harvard Graduate School of Business 
Administration, as a replacement for "principles" of management or administra-
tion. Yet the basic tradition of the Harvard Business School has been to 
concentrate upon the development of skills in reacting to the complex problems 
presented in the school's thousands of case studies. Little effort has been 
made to formulate "currently useful generalizations" in explicit terms. As a 
result, many implicit premises underlying professorial behaviour at the 
school have not' been brought up-to-date and have survived long after they have 
become obsolete. The moral for public administration and the administration 
of economic development plans, as well as business administration, is that bold 
and continuing efforts are needed to state and re-state, amend and reject, 
generalizations that can be of help in dealing with new and changing problems. 
Generalizations can be useful only -when used and use requires certain knowledge, 
abilities and interests on the part of the users. Principles of planning and 
development administration can supply only a firmer foundation, but never a substi-
tute for the judgement and intuitive wisdom of planners, administrators and 
national leaders. 15/ 
15/ Administrators and political leaders, who find difficulty in grappling with 
abstract generalizations, establish a false standard for judging the utility 
of a theory, maintaining that' it is not useful if it does not provide specific 
answers to specific questions. Good administrative and political theory, 
however, "must themselves deal with the limitations of both theories and 
theoreticians in an administrative environment ... with the components of 
organizational action other than theory of knowledge"« B. Gross, The Managing 
of Organizations, 2 vols. (New York: Free Press, 1964)? pp. 315-316. 
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I. INTERDEPENDENCE OF PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION 
11» Through bitter experience it has become increasingly apparent that progress 
in economic development requires a realistic awareness of the close interdependence 
between planning and administration. The lack of this awareness may lead to a 
dangerous separation between plan formulation and plan implementation and to serious 
misunderstandings between planning technicians and administrators at all levels of 
government. 
12. It is very difficult, however, to attain an explicit and readily communic-
able awareness of this interdependence. The words "planning" and "administration" 
mean different things to different people. There are different concepts — indeed 
philosophies — of both planning and administration. These inherent difficulties 
are compounded by the varying linguistic usages in different languages, countries, 
cultures, organizational environments, and scientific disciplines. 
13. Nevertheless, without trying to resolve all the terminological differences, 
it may be possible to set forth a few helpful propositions. 
A. Planning as an integral part of the administrative process 
14. In almost all countries, administration is regarded as the process through 
which administrators (or managers, executives, administrative assistants, etc.) 
help achieve certain purposes through the activities of people in an organization. 
The organization may be public, private or mixed. The administrators may operate 
at varying levels of authority, responsibility and prestige. They must deal not 
only with subordinates and immediate associates, but also with the external environ-
ment of their organization (or unit). At the higher levels of administration, the 
administrators need many highly specialized administrative services. At the highest 
levels of central government administration, administrators face environmental 
challenges of enormous complexity and must call upon specialist services of in-
creasing complexity. 
15. Although administrators and theorists from different countries would use 
different words to express the content of the above paragraph, most of them could 
readily agree with the substance — so far as it goes. 
16. Interestingly enough, if we go one step further and state that planning is 
an essential part of the administrative process, there will be even greater agree-
ment. The concept of planning as part of the administrative process has been a 
continuing part of all administrative thought. Thus, early in the twentieth century 
Henri Fayol identified five elements of administration. The first was "to forecast 
and plan". The others: to organize, command, co-ordinate and control. Planning 
was one of the major preoccupations of Frederick Taylor. It was the first of the 
seven administrative processes in Luther Gulick's famous POSDCORB. It was a major 
concern of both Mary Parker Follett and Chester Barnard. It is a major orientation 
of the mathematically inclined technicians engaged in "management science"• Indeed, 
even the most modern thinkers and teachers follow the lead of Fayol by subdividing 
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administration generally into the more specific administrative processes of planning 
and control or, with the term "control" split into its two components, planning, 
activating and evaluating. Decision-making and communicating, in turn, are often 
usually regarded as underlying processes that enter into planning as well as into 
activating and evaluating„¿6/ 
17. Terminological difficulties develop, however, with the expansion of specia-
lized staff services to help administrators plan. The term "planning" is often 
used in the title of specialized staff agencies. The more specialized members of 
these agencies are often called "planners" and may even be thought of as "the 
planners"* This terminology often leads to the planners vs. doers illusion, where-
by it is assumed that the specialized technicians have some monopoly on the planning 
process and the administrators are involved "only" in doing. This leads, in turn, 
to a situation in which all the important planning is done by the doers without 
their having the benefit of enlightenment and stimulus by staff specialists who 
understand their problems« 
18. To counteract this widespread fallacy, we need something more than termi-
nological clarification and consistency. Towards this end, the following principle 
may be formulated: "The most effective government planners are those involved in 
certain day-to-day activities of government." Administrators are more than mere 
doers. More than anyone else, they are heavily involved in making the critical 
decisions on programmes and policies and developing the network of commitments that 
make any part of a plan feasible. Naturally, "involved in" does not mean "pre-
occupied with". Total preoccupation with day-to-day activities may prevent both 
technicians and administrators from giving enough attention to planning for the 
future. "Involved in" means having the kind of contact with current decision-
making without which people are scarcely qualified to understand the peculiar prob-
lems in each country, the uniqueness of every situation, the specific obstacles 
that must be overcome and the capacities of key institutions, groups, and indivi-
duals. This contact may be obtained by participating in one way or another in such 
critical current matters as the annual budget, the handling of foreign currency 
controls, the reorganization of a major project, the breaking of critical bottle-
necks or the evaluation of certain successes or failures. Contact with such current 
matters, it might be added, provides an essential bridge between the present and the 
future. After all, the major contribution of middle-range and long-range planning 
16/ These various concepts of planning are summarized in the chapters of The 
Managing of Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1964)• A detailed analysis 
of the administrative processes of planning, activating and evaluating, linked 
with decision-making and communicating, is provided in the same publication 
in chapter 29, entitled "Rationality: Administrative Processes". 
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is to serve as a guide to current action.—' Thus, planners for the middle-range 
and long-range future, including both administrators and specialists, need contact 
with the immediate and emergent present, rather than isolation from the present in 
a comfortable ivory tower. 
19. This proposition, let it be noted, has many implications for the admini-
strative machinery of national development planning and for the development of 
centre-regional-local relations. Some of these will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
B. Plan administration as social system guidance 
20. It is a truism that national economic planning deals with efforts to change 
the structure and performance of an economy. This is why good economists and high-
quality economic analysis are essential for success in planned economic development. 
But the distance is not far from this truism to the dangerous fallacy of economic 
planning as merely economics. This fallacy, often unwittingly propagated by the 
behaviour of economists who know better, has resulted in an underestimation of the 
critical roles of administrators and political leaders in both the formulation and 
the implementation of economic goals. It has led to a tight monopoly by economists 
on positions of professional advice-giving. It has diverted the attention of many 
young economists from the great tasks of institution building and social recon-
struction and contributed to their estrangement from administrators and national 
leaders. This fallacy has helped the supersalesmen of sophisticated econometrics — 
and has in turn been propagated by them — in their efforts to present mathematical 
economics as the major conceptual tool for economic development. The result has 
often been the wasting of good brains on refined technicalities -with little or no 
basis in empirical data and a parallel neglect of tasks of collecting more reliable 
data than can be put together through the less spectacular processes of definition, 
addition and subtraction. 
21. On the other hand, there is increasing recognition in all countries of the 
fact that economic planning is much more than economics. Hence, a sophisticated 
descriptive proposition, developed at an international conference, tells us that 
"many of the conscious objectives and unintended consequences, as well as many of the 
means required for goal formulation, implementation ana evaluation, are usually 
political, cultural, social or ' biophysical rather than merely economic".10/ In 
17/ This point is developed at somewhat greater length in the fifth proposition set 
forth in Gross, "National Planning: Findings and Fallacies" in Public 
Administration Review, December, 196$. 
18/ Robert J. Shafer et al, "What Is National Planning?" Action under Planning, 
op. cit. 
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prescriptive terms, this proposition may be re-stated as follows: "All planners 
should recognize that economic considerations are intimately tied up with a large 
variety of non-economic variables." 
22. Experienced planners know that there is no such thing as a purely economic 
problem. Any real-life economic problem — once we escape the ceteris paribus 
assumptions of economic theory — is usually also a problem in administrative and 
organizational change, in the political balancing of divergent interests, in 
changing cultural values, and in the technologies of dealing with physical, bio-
logical or ecological processes. Although economic analysis touches almost every-
thing and, when imaginatively applied, can provide a useful entry into anything, 
it can cover nothing completely or definitively. 
23. One of the great paradoxes in planned economic development, however, is 
that those who seek to deal wisely with the non-economic as well as the economic 
variables run the risk of getting mired down in too much complexity. To jump 
around from one discipline to another, from economics to political science, socio-
logy, anthropology, psychology, management theory, the administrative sciences and 
operations research, is to run the risk of a dilettantish loss of all perspective. 
The remedy for the narrowness of economic models, therefore, may well be not the 
juggling of a large number of non-economic models, but rather the development of a 
general model of society that brings the economic and non-economic concepts to-
gether into an integrated framework. Towards this end, important work is being 
done on systems theory. Many directions for future work are suggested in The State 
of the Nation, 19/ which sets forth a general systems model of a social system at 
the level of the nation-state, with an indication of how the model may be applied — 
with certain adjustments — to the major subsystems in any nation. "This model 
incorporates the major concepts traditionally used in national economic accounting, 
but broadens them from a set of economic indicators alone to a set of social indi-
cators. According to this model, the state of any nation at any period of time — 
past, present or future — can be analysed in terms of two interrelated multi-
dimensional elements: system structure and system performance. The elements of 
system structure deal with the internal relations among the system's parts, the 
elements of system performance with the acquiring of inputs and their transforma-
tion into outputs. Both involve relations with the external environment. This 
mode, or any part thereof, may be flexibly applied to describe the unique charac-
teristics of any country whatsoever, no matter what the level of industrial deve-
lopment or the type of political regime The value of a general systems 
approach to all possible variables is that it provides a background for selecting 
those variables most appropriate to specific situations and for changing one's 
focus as the occasion warrants. It can prevent ceteris paribus from becoming 
ceteris incognitis¿."¿0/ 
19/ B. Gross, The State of the Nation, op. cit. 
20/ Ibid., part 1. 
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24. The most effective administrators and economic advisers already operate 
intuitively on the unstated premise that their task is to .guide major changes in 
social structure and performance. With their help and participation, it will be 
possible to convert their intuitive wisdom into explicit concepts and generali-
zations concerning national planning as the guidance of change in social systems. 
C. Administrators as integrating generalists 
25. One of the greatest ideas and traditions of administrative theory and 
practice has been the concept of the administrator as the generalist. "This con-
cept is particularly applicable to the higher-level administrators, whose respon-
sibilities usually include the co-ordination of the work of many specialises or 
experts. It may also be applied to other administrators as well — albeit in a 
more limited sense. Even though they operate at a lower level of generality, they 
are usually involved in the co-ordination of the work of Different people with 
special problems and viewpoints. Also, in handling relations with the external 
environment of their units, they usually deal with a more varied array of problems 
than faced by their subordinates. -21/ 
26. Unfortunately, the concept of the administrator as generalist has been 
undermined from two directions. On the one hand, the tradition of the "gentleman 
generalist" in some countries has produced many administrators with a narrow, 
parochial attitude towards specialized expertise in economics, engineering and 
other technical fields. On the other hand, the fondness for specialization in 
certain other countries has led to an over-emphasis upon the proliferation of 
narrow techniques. This has been particularly apparent in the field of public 
administration, where such specialized techniques in work study, personnel matters 
and budgeting have often been regarded as the essence of administration, rather 
than simply as certain types of aids in administration. With administrative theo-
rists and "experts" deserting the generalist area, the fallacy of administration 
as technical gadgetry has become rather widespread. This has been most dangerous 
in the field of so-called "civil service reform". Here attempts have been made to 
take job classification techniques and so-called "merit systems" originally deve-
loped for large, stable organizations in industrial societies and to apply them to 
small, rapidly-changing organizations in pre-industrial societies. The results of 
these efforts require dispassionate evaluation by observers not committed to the 
merits of the original reform proposals. Preliminary observations in certain 
countries suggest that these reform efforts may have at time the unintended effect 
of curtailing initiative and enterprise in development agencies, enlarging the 
heavy burden of regulations and paperwork on people trying to get a job done and 
contributing to the evasion of civil service controls as the only way to get things 
done. 
21/ B. Gross, The Mar aging of Organizations,, op.: cit,, "The Management of 
Organizations," chapter 10, p. 242. 
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27. To cope with such problems, it is essential to build upon the concept of 
the administrator as generalist. But the day of the Gentleman Generalist is over. 
Nor is it enough that development plans be administered by Middlemen Generalists, 
who concentrate on making deals and compromises among the growing number of special-
ists. . jn industrializing nations, a major principle of true administrative reform 
should be that "effective development requires greater recognition of the need for 
Integrating Generalists ". 
28. In general terms, the qualities of the Integrating Generalists may be de-
scribed as follows: They are expected to see the woods as well as the trees and to 
be motivated by interests broader than their own or even of their own organization. 
They are looked to for skills not only in communication and compromise, but in the 
constructive integration of divergent interests. They are expected to understand 
the organization1s broad environment as well as, or even more than, its internal 
workings. They are expected to know enough about relevant techniques to enable 
them to understand, evaluate and co-ordinate the activities of many specialists 
and professionals.22/ 
29. The integrating function of the development generalist has many aspects. 
It involves the integration of the many specialized administrative techniques, so 
that the use of administrative gadgets is subordinated to the higher objectives of 
economic and social progress. Only thus can truly meaningful "civil service 
reform" programmes be developed and put into practice. It involves a continuous 
prodding of economists by probing into their premises and definitions, by setting 
them on right tracks and carefully judging their performance. This means that the 
true generalist must learn enough about economics and other specialized fields to 
understand their limitations and their distinctive contributions. Rather than 
feeling uneasy when confronted by experts, the Integrating Generalist must always 
be aware of the necessity of getting the benefit of conflicting expert judgements 
and the desirability of encouraging new and promising fields of expertise and 
specialization. He must be aware of the need to help specialists appreciate the 
real-life complexities of the problems faced by administrators and political 
leaders and the interrelations among the many fields of expertise. But he must 
never underestimate the tremendous contributions that can be made by the high-class, 
narrow expert, who is concerned primarily with his own expertise. The administra-
tor must be able to relate the work of such an expert into the society as a whole. 
30. Above all, the integrating function extends not only to specialists, but to 
special groups and interests in the society. The Integrating Generalist knows how 
to build an "activation base" (or "support network") for development programmes by 
22/ B. Gross, The Managing of Organizations, op. cit. 
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organizing various coalitions and allianc 
individuals. It is in this important sen 
words of a recent report, the role of the 
zation rather than supervision'. . .(with) 
and co-operation and not on hierarchy and 
• s among public and private groups and 
:e that, in the extremely significant 
administrator has become "one of mobili-
development based on activity, impetus 
authority. 
23/ Administration of National Development Planning, Report of a Meeting of 
Experts held at Paris, France, 8-19 June 1964 (United Nations document, 
ST/TAO/M/27), p.5. 
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II. IMPLEMENTATION: STRATEGIC GUIDELINES 
31. The generalist administrator, as already suggested, tries to understand the 
broad environment within which he operates. If he fails to do this, he may become 
thoroughly bogged down in the technicalities of complex issues and in the perverse 
intricacies of group conflicts and manouevering. 
32. As a result, he may easily lose sight of the world in which he and his 
colleagues operate, of the possible implications for his country of the revolution-
ary developments in modern science and technology, of the potentialities of the 
future, and particularly of people as human beings. To the extent that this 
happens, he becomes less capable of providing strategic guidance to technicians and 
strategic advice to political leaders. Accordingly, it might be useful to suggest 
certain general guidelines that may help national planners achieve and maintain a 
balanced perspective. 
A. The emerging world society 
33» In the first full-flush of campaigns to win independence from colonial rule, 
national leaders must necessarily appeal to nationalistic aspirations. They must 
stress the glories of self-rule and self-determination. After political indepen-
dence is won, they often find themselves in control of a state, but not a nation-. 
The absence of any wide sense of "nationhood" compels them to engage in the arduous 
labours of "nation-building". It has long been recognized that investment in 
nation-building may demand expenditure and investment policies that, from a narrow 
point of view, seem un-economic, but, from a broader viewpoint, lay the political 
foundations for subsequent economic growth. What has not been usually recognized, 
however, is that nation-building efforts may too readily create a widespread 
illusion of national autonomy. 
34« The fact of the matter, hovrever, is that "the environment of all national 
planners is the emergence of a world society of increasingly interdependent nationf-V 
Today, as Russett has pointed out, " 'one world' has a meaning beyond the 
understanding even of those who lived just a generation age •" 2k/ Indeed, in previous 
generations, people tended to think of some future world society as some blissful 
state of rational order to some anti-utopian form of central regimentation. What 
has actually been happening is neither the Utopian dream nor the anti-utopian 
nightmare. 
24/ Bruce Russett, Trends in World Politics, (New York: Macmillan, I965), p. 121. 
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35. In another context, some preliminary comments follow on the actual world 
scene; 
"Today, unheralded and uncelebrated, a world society is slowly 
and painfully coming into being. It is characterized by the growth 
of increasingly interdependent nations, both industrializing and 
post-industrializing, of world-spanning organizations, of urban 
world centres, and of world-oriented elites. This growing inter-
dependence is facilitated by communication-transportation systems 
that, for some activities, are continuously decreasing the space-
time distance between Washington and Moscow more rapidly than that 
between Washington and Wichita or Moscow and Mintz. 
"The emerging 'One World' hardly conforms to the visions of the 
Utopians — any more than does the giant organization to 'classical' 
ideas of administration, the megalopolis to the models of city 
planners or the 'great societies' to Keynesian theory. The world 
society includes a bewildering variety of subsystems increasingly 
locked together in conflict-co-operation relationships. The world 
polity is characterized by polycentric conflict, intersecting 
coalitions, continuing outbreaks of localized violence, many 
possibilities of 'escalation,' and spreading capacities for nuclear 
destruction. The political instrumentalities of conflict resolution 
and regional and world integration operate — as in nations, states 
and cities — in an atmosphere of pressure and power politics, 
behind-the-scene lobbying, rotten borough representation, moralistic 
double-talk, deception and self-deception. The world economy tends 
to be disorderly — neither free nor planned. The world culture, 
on the one hand, tends to submerge national characteristics and 
values in a homogenizing flood of material goods and international 
styles. On the other hand, it includes vast value differences and 
sharp value conflicts. Like Megalopolis, the world society is a 
territorial entity without a government. It is an all-inclusive 
complex macro-system with remarkably complicated and unpredictable 
— although increasingly structured — mechanisms of mutual 
adjustment." 
36. These confusing facts of life have at least three important implications. 
First, in their nation-building efforts, the leaders and administrators 
25/ B. Gross, Space-Time and Post-Industrialism, op. cit., pp. 45-46. 
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of industrializing societies must clearly see that they are building interdependent 
nations» They should not confuse political independence with dreams of perfect 
autonomy, autarchy or self-sufficiency. They must recognize the necessity of 
developir.g the capacity to engage in an ever-growing array of transnational 
operations, including trade, finance, tourism and politics. 
37. Second, they must try to understand the world, particularly the changing world 
economy and the shifting structure of international power. This does not mean that 
they must understand the world. Few have yet "been able to do this. But an effort 
to understand must be made and, with the realization that this may require, new 
ways must be found of looking at facts and makirg rapid adjustments to new 
situations. 
38. Third, and of no less importance, the national planners in industrializing 
nations must give even greater attention to the strengthening of the United Nations, 
its specialized agencies, its regional organizations, and, above all, its central 
organs. Despite its weaknesses, the United Nations is nonetheless the world's best 
hope for peace. It can perform functions in the promotion of economic and social 
progress that cannot possibly be handled in any other way. It can harmonize the 
national planning of individual countries — a vital function in an interdependent 
world. Overly-nationalistic planning could easily lead to cut-throat international 
competition, "beggar thy neighbour" policies and international economic warfare. 
Only through greatly expanded and improved activities by the United Nations, on a 
world-wide as well as a regional basis, can the framework be developed for the kind 
of national planning that will contribute to both progress and peace. 
B. The new science-technology revolution 
39« One of the most obvious factors in creating the new world society, as already 
indicated, has been the remarkable growth of world-spanning communication and 
transportation systems. Yet these systems, which will be much more spectacular in 
another five years, are merely a dramatic aspect of more far-reaching scientific and 
technological changes that are having revolutionary effects upon every country in 
the world. Indeed, one of the most dangerous proverbs of our modern era is that the 
scientific and technological revolution took place in the nineteenth century. The 
development of the steam engine, the spinning jenny, the railroad and the wireless 
was nothing but a prelude to what is happening now. Indeed, the new science-
technology revolution of the computer, high-energy physics, ' physics and bio-
chemistry is already bringing about (as it is also a product of) a great social 
transformation in Western societies from the last stages of industrialism to the 
first stages of post-industrialism. 
40. In the United States this vast, unheralded social transformation is already 
characterized by 
(a) An "information explosion" that, by creating great new areas 
of knowledge that few people can keep up with, has brought into 
being an "ignorance explosion"; 
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(b) A declining volume of employment in the production of goods? 
(c) A vast expansion in services; 
(d) The growth of the "learning force" (the total number of people 
engaged in formal educational programmes) to the point where 
it will soon exceed the employed labour force; 
(e) Totally new relations between work, education, leisure, and 
recreation^ 
(f) New values and interests based upon abundance rather than 
scarcity; and 
(g) New social conflicts as people and institutions find difficulty 
in adjusting to new conditions. 26/ 
41. In the industrializing countries it is not yet clear what the implications may 
be of the new science—technology revolution. On the one hand, lacking the 
scientific institutions and personnel capable of innovating or even of "keeping up" 
on a broad front, the development planners in these countries must for a 
considerable time depend upon "pipelines" from those countries on the front lines of 
scientific progress. On the other hand, it may be possible in many areas to 
"leapfrog" obsolescent technology and, without being embarrassed by heavy 
investments in older methods, start out on a higher plane. To do this successfully, 
the industrializing countries must guard against being used as the dumping grounds 
for obsolescent machinery and experts. 
42. In the post-industrializing parts of the world, an operating axiom is "if it 
works, it's obsolete." This cannot, and should not be taken over by development 
planners in industrializing countries where, in connexion with the beginning of any 
new project, the comparable comment might be "if it works, it's a miracle." But the 
development planners in industrializing societies must question all technical 
proposals, whether submitted by local experts or prestigious foreign experts. They 
must never take for granted that a technology that has proved itself elsewhere in the 
26/ B. Gross, Space-Time, and Post-Twdustrialism, op. cit. Sco also the Sections 
-n'Frcn Pre- to Post-Industrialism"^and "Industrializing and Post-Industrial-
izing Performance Patterns" in Gross, The State of the Nation, op. cit. 
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past is necessarily the most appropriate for the next stages of their own 
development. For better or v/orse, difficult though it may be, they must prepare 
themselves to accept the principle that "in a world of revolutionary, scientific 
and technological changes, the planners of accelerated economic development must 
always be alert to the potentialities of new technology 
C. Planning for the improbable 
43« Like politics, administration has often been called the "art of the possible"-
In the administration of economic development planning, this phrase is particularly 
relevant. It warns against "paper planning," against blind commitments to the 
blatantly impossible. It reminds us that desirability is not the only test of a 
rational course of action and that desirability must be blended with feasibility. 
And, if a major development project such as a new dam is to be feasible, many 
practical requirementsmust be satisfied. Not only the technical plans must be 
available, but the money also; not only the money, but the materials, machinery and 
trained labour to be obtained with the money; not only the resources, but the 
administrators capable of using such resources and maintaining their supply; not 
only the administrative capacity, but the political backing and coalition of 
supporting agencies necessary to overcome all sorts of inertia and resistance. 
44* Once the first full-flush of enthusiasm for development planning is passed,_~' 
once the planners begin to face up to the almost unbelievable difficulties in ¿;cttX6-
anything done, there is the danger of a quick swing of the pendulum. From the 
previous extremes of seeking the impossible, the planners may go so far in 
emphasizing the possible that they will think mainly of short-run feasibility. In 
this effort, they will often be encouraged by economists who have become accustomed 
to fighting utopia with myopia, that is, with "hard nosed" calculations of the ¿mall 
benefits that might be obtained quickly. The result can easily be that instead of 
planning for the impossible, they will focus upon the most possible and feasible of 
all, namely, the inevitable. This is the fallacy of epiphenomenal planning. 27/ 
Here the main advantage is that the planners can take credit for any minor progress 
that might have taken place anyway. And, if no progress takes place, they can 
justify their action by appealing to certain modern concepts of rationality as 
"Epiphenomenal planning" is a term first used by Peter Wiles in his The 
Political Economy of Communism (Cambridge, Mass.s Harvard University Press, 
1962), pp. 72-75. Wiles uses the term broadly, including not only planning 
for what will happen anyway, but also planning backed up by persuasive 
efforts only. The term should preferably be confined to the first of 
these usages. 
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"incremental meliorism" or "the science of muddling through". 28/ 
45. Yet, "the possible" covers a broad spectrum. It includes everything ranging 
from the inevitable and the most feasible up to the somewhat improbable and thi. 
highly improbable. To the extent that man is capable of influencing events on this 
earth, he escapes the constrictions of the former and moves more frequently towards 
the latter. Indeed, the major aims of economic planning in industrializing nations 
is to attain the improbable. This requires the highest skills of administration and 
political leadership — the skills needed to transcend obvious feasibilities and 
bring the improbable into being. Thus, "in its highest forms, development planning 
is the art of the improbable, not merely the possible." 
46. The entire history of Western industrial growth in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries has been one of taking great risks - and many failures. In 
driving forward towards accelerated industrialization, the leaders of today's 
industrializing nations can hardly afford to be paralyzed by the overcautious fear 
of failure. It is not enough to heed the warning in the Book of Proverbs: "Whore 
there is no vision, the people perish." They should also ponder the words of the 
Mahabrata: "No man can reap good without incurring danger." 
47» "The danger of futile utopianism does not lie in the grandeur of a vision or 
the beauty of a dream. It lies rather in the failure to concentrate on the myriad 
details of today and tomorrow (for this is where the future is made) and the failure 
to learn today from yesterday's past errors. 29/ Indeed, incremental meliorism is 
one of the weapons in the arsenal of those who are masters of the art of the 
improbable. No revolutionary change has ever occurred except through a sequence of 
small steps. The vision is lost only when the planners fail to deal with long, 
flexible sequences of small steps leading towards distant goals. "Muddling through," 
in the sense of making necessary compromises and shifting from one immediate goal to 
another, does not necessarily shatter the great dream, so long as the compromisers 
and goal shifters keep their eyes on the long-run strategic objectives that justify 
their daily tactics. In the past twenty years, mention has often been made of the 
"economic miracles" achieved by two industrialized nations, Japan and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. There is good reason, to believe that in the next twenty years 
successful planning for the improbable, aided by scientific ideas and technologies 
not yet developed, will yield many more such "miracles" among the nations now 
starting the industrializing process. 
28/ Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through"* Public Administration 
Review, Vol. XIX, No. 1, Spring 1958, pp. 79-88. 
29/ Bertram M. Gross, "The Gamesmanship of National Planning", prefatory comment 
to Fred G. Burke, Tanganyika: Preplanning (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1965), pp. xxviii-xxix. 
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D. The interest of human beings 
48. One of the charges against industrialization as it developed in the past is 
that people have been forgotten in the industrialized world. They have been 
treated, the social critics tell us, as cogs in a machine, commoditiOB to be 
bought and sold, things to be manipulated, instruments of achieving power and 
building wealth — but not as human beings. 30/ It is well to ask whether there 
may not be similar tendencies among the nations now entering the early stages of 
industrialization. 
49. It would appear that the current styles of economic development planning 
often lead planners and administrators to forget human interests. Projections of 
income and product, savings, investment, and consumption, foreign trade and foreign 
currency often take on a reality of their own, which is divorced from contact with 
people and their interests. Projects, dams, factories, and agricultural production 
are defined in cold and presumably scientific terms that, apparently, have no 
connexion with definable groups of people. Indeed, in many national plans, most 
books on development economics and almost all books on the administrative aspects 
of development planning, little or nothing is said about the human interests of 
man. This is the widespread and extremely dangerous fallacy of forgettjm People. 
50. Yet — and this is one of the most important principles of development 
administration — "the only good justification of national planning is to help serve 
the interests of people". In an abstract way planners will quickly bow to this 
principle by pointing out that the long-run objective of their planning is to 
increase the material well-being of all the people in their country. Having 
disposed of the matter, many of them will then return to their projections, projects 
and budgets. 
51. But it is a terrible over-simplification to think of material well-being as 
the only interests of man that can be served through national planning. The 
interests of people in overcoming poverty, disease, ignorance and despair are 
inextricably tied up with their equally deep human interests in justice, dignity, 
self-respect and the ability to participate in decisions affecting their lives. The 
"quality of life" is of concern not only to the rich nations, but to all mankind. 
52. This is not merely a matter of long-range objectives. As a short-range matter, 
the very viability of any national planning system depends upon what interests and 
whose interests it is seen as serving. Every important planning decision involves 
30/ This criticism has been made by many authors including Marx, Schweitzer, 
Orwell, lumford, Huxley, Kafka, William H. Whyte, Fromm, Argyris and Marcuse. 
Their views have been briefly summarized in "Threats to Mankind", Chapter 4 
in Gross, The Managing of Organization, op. cit. 
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some calculation concerning the interests that will he served or frustrated. 
Indeed, a projected "level of investment" refers to the behaviour of identifiable 
people in their role as investors, savers and consumers. Any price index is merely 
a convenient way of reporting on the behaviour of certain people in their roles as 
buyers and sellers of certain goods or services. Indeed, a plan itself is merely a 
way of describing the desired future behaviour of certain people and groups, lore 
specifically, it usually describes how some people want many other people to behave. 
53- There are many difficulties involved in dealing frankly with human interests. 
With every development project, every sectoral programme, every cross-sectoral 
policy, there are many parties and interests, most of which are divergent and 
conflicting. Every group and individual, in turn, has interests that are multiple, 
hard to identify, divergent and conflicting. With every forward step in development 
progress, many of these interests are apt to change. They are apt to change 
radically from one generation to another. It is extremely hard to appraise the 
extent to which specific interests of any group have in fact been satisfied or 
frustrated, Indeed, satisfaction and dissatisfaction are often closely connected, 
as are irrational, non-rational and rational behaviour. Finally, the ubiquity of 
interest conflicts, as evidenced in pressure-group activity and civil unrest, may 
lead some administrators and planners to the cynical conclusion that they cannot 
find any "public interest" or "common interest." 
54« There was once a famous judge who used to ask his former law clerks whenever 
he met them "What have you done recently to serve the people?" Some top 
administrators, when confronted with complex technical issues, are in the habit of 
asking "What could this (or the other) course of action mean in the daily lives of 
people? Which people? When?" 
55« These are the kinds of questions that should be asked more frequently by 
development administrators. In the process of asking, they must probe carefully, 
trying to identify the specific interests that may be met or violated and looking for 
the compromises and creative adjustments that can cope with dangerous interest 
conflicts. In a major sense,a national development plan is a programme for meeting 
certain common interests of all the people in a country. There is no place in 
national Planning for administrators and planners who are cynical and scornful of 
public interest orientations. The world needs more national planners and plan 
administrators who, by their understanding of peopfe's divergent and conflicting 
interests, can get action to serve the various interests of many people and groups. 
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III. IMPLEMENTATION: OBSTACLES 
56. While maintaining and promoting perspective on the world environment and human 
aspects of development planning, plan administrators must also take a realistic 
view of the many obstacles standing in the way of actual progress. Indeed, they 
must be capable of diagnosing the specific obstacles that impede action in the 
unique circumstances of time and place. 
57. Adequate diagnosis, however, is not always forthcoming. "Like any other prob-
1 emj the problem of getting desirable results through economic development plan-
ning is often responded to in an irrational manner. The existence of an implemen-
tation problem may at first be denied. When admitted, it may be handled in terms 
of an habitual reaction without any effort at diagnosis." 51/ The attempted treat-
ment may be irrelevant to the difficulties or may even accentuate them. 
58. The following principles are presented merely as possible, but far from, suffi-
cient aids in the delicate process of diagnosing unique difficulties. 
A. Resource scarcities: physical, human and organizational 
59. Since expertise is an essential element in all forms of modern planning, there 
is a natural tendency for many people to think that any obstacle to successful plan-
ning may be overcome by a greater application of expert knowledge. This knowledge 
is all"illusion is, indeed, often fostered by "experts" themselves and by the ad-
ministrators of technical assistance programmes. 
60. From a long-range viewpoint, of course, the advance of human knowledge, partic-
ularly in the form of science and technology, is the most dynamic and significant 
factor in economic growth. But the opportunities for exploiting science and tech-
nology in any particular country exist within the constraints of a specific bio-
physical environment. In industrializing countries, it may be stated categorically 
that "the first obstacles to economic growth are scarcities of physical, human and 
institutional resources". 
61. The most obvious scarcities are in the field of physical assets. On the one 
hand, there is only a limited supply, which is very unevenly distributed, of 
housing, household equipment, food, clothing and medical supplies. On the other 
hand, there is only a limited supply of the resources needed to expand consumer 
goods: plant, equipment and machinery; a suitable infrastructure of communication, 
transportation, electric power and irrigation facilities; and a well-roundea 
natural resource base. On this last point, it must be noted that natural resources, 
such as agricultural forest, miner and water, tend to be unevenly distributed over 
the face of the earth. The Western world, including North America as well as 
31/ Bertram M. Gross, "Activating National Plans," in Gross, ed. 
Action under Planning, op. cit. 
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Europe, has been more conspicuously endowed with a broad variety of such resources 
than the rest of the globe. 32/ Most of the poor countries suffer from, and are 
characterized by, serious resource deficiencies. Agricultural and forest land typi-
cally suffer from erosion, soil depletion and recurrent droughts and floods. "The 
peoples of the present under»-developed areas do not have the opportunity of moving 
to virgin land that is richer than the land now occupied. In most under-developed 
countries, the present distribution of population reflects very accurately the dis-
tribution of known resources, including soil fertility." 35/ The situation with res-
pect to mineral resources is very uneven. Where high-quality resources were long 
since discovered during previous periods of exploitation, this has usually led to 
lop-sided economic development — as in Mexico, Venezuela and the oil-rich countries 
of the Middle East. Other known mineral reserves are often composed of low-quality 
ores requiring expensive processes of extraction or refining. In many cases, more-
over, the extent of mineral resources is not known; exploration and development are 
expensive and long drawn-out processes. 
62. But people are the most important resource in any country. Natural and man-
made wealth are "resources" only because people find them useful and develop them. 
In absolute and purely quantitative terms, the industrializing countries, particu-
larly those with the largest and the most rapidly growing populations, are "people 
rich." Their people represent great untapped reservoirs of productive power and 
undeveloped sources of purchasing power. But relative to other resources, such as, 
land, machinery and electrical energy, the population is often so large as to cons-
titute a serious burden. More important, the quantitative over-supply of people in 
relation to physical resources is usually accompanied also by a serious qualitative 
under-supply of people with an adequate level of health and physical energy, 
literacy, education and training. Indeed, every "developing" country in Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa and Latin America is seriously handicapped by the lack of 
people with high-level technical and managerial skills. 
32/ The percentage distribution of the world's supply of potential energy from all 
sources other than manpower (that is, from coal, oil and natural gas, water, 
wood, manure and work animals) has been estimated as follows for 1948: 















TOTAL 83.2 TOTAL 16.8 
Source: W.S. Woytinsky and E.S. Woytinsky. World Population and 
Production (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1956), p. 931. 
33/ Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development (New York: Norton, 1959), p. 244. 
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63. To the shortages of knowledge and skills must be added the lack of widespread, 
realistic motivation. After centuries of poverty and oppression, apathy and hope-
lessness tend to become a way of life. Recurrent failures to obtain small material 
improvements, together with the broken promises of politicians, support whatever 
tendencies towards fatalism that may exist in the traditional culture. Thus Kusum 
Nair, after visiting scores of Indian villages, reports upon the widespread pheno-
menon of "limited aspirations." She finds that 
"A great majority of the rural communities do not share in this 
concept of an ever-rising standard of living. The upper level 
they are prepared to strive for is limited and it is the floor 
generally that is bottomless . . . . In a situation of limited 
and static aspirations, if a man should feel that his require-
ments are just two bags of paddy per year, he works for two 
bags, but not for more. If he looks to the stars, it is only 
to worship them, not to pluck them."54/ 
64. Similar reports may be obtained from those who have visited among the peasants 
of Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The "revolution of rising 
expectations," so widely hailed as the driving force behind economic development in 
the poor nations, certainly exists, but as a revolution of uneven expectations. It 
expresses the great aspirations of rising elites, particularly a minority of nation-
al leaders, intellectuals and entrepreneurs. When development motivations are 
aroused more broadly, many people tend to expect immediate miracles. This easily 
may lead to a "revolution of rising frustrations". 
65. Although development economists have increasingly recognized the importance of 
the human factor, they have usually considered people as isolated individuals or 
members of "classification categories" dealing with skill levels or occupations. 
Yet individuals, no matter how able, can do little by themselves. They can produce 
significant increments of wealth only when working together in organizations, such 
as enterprises, associations, government agencies or political parties. Thus the 
industrial revolution in Europe and North America was accompanied by the growth of 
new, large and highly differentiated institutions capable of bringing people and 
physical resources together in the exploitation of science and technology. This has 
often been called the organizational, managerial or administrative revolution. The 
shortages of these institutional resources is a major handicap to the industrial-
izing nations of today. (See the discussion of this point in chapter V-B.) 
B. Realities of social conflict 
66. Many planning technicians see national development planning as a "blackboard" 
problem exercise far removed from the real world of clashing values, competing in-
terests and changing social systems. Indeed, as Gunnar Myrdal has pointed out with 
reference to non-Marxist thought, "there has always been a tendency in economics to 
gloss over interest conflicts". 35/ Accordingly, a special version of the 
34/ Kusum Nair, Blossoms in the Dust (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 193-
35/ Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954). 
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"knowledge is all" illusion has grown up: The fallacy of economic planning as 
merely economics. Indeed, as the currently accepted experts on almost all aspects 
of development planning at the national level, many economists have assiduously pro-
pagated this dangerous fallacy. True, in abstract terms they are always willing to 
recognize variables outside the realm of their expertise, as is also done by the 
architects and engineers who dominate, respectively, city planning and enterprise 
planning. But far more than the architects and engineers, they prefer the mainte-
nance of monopolistic control of "their" field. This has been sadly and repeatedly 
illustrated by the many reports by economists on "plan implementation", which com-
bine purely economic analysis with remarkably naive and pedestrian ventures into 
public administration. 
67. Nevertheless, there is increasing recognition of the fact that "development 
planning is inevitably involved in various forms of open and hidden social con-
flicts". In their mildest forms, these conflicts take the simple form of inertia. 
People and organizations are not easily moved. They are weighted down by habit and 
custom just as physical objects are weighted down by their mass. As with physical 
objects, any effort to move or change them even a little bit is apt to create fric-
tion. An effort to move them far or quickly is apt to create active resistance and 
bring counterplans into being. 
68. The most active form of resistance is based upon a felt conflict of inter-
ests. 56/ In the case of "cross-sectoral" plans, 57/ a certain kind of resistance 
can reasonably be anticipated from the very nature of the plans themselves. Thus 





Higher interest rates 
Lower interest rates 
Taxpayers 
Wage earners, particularly their 





56/ The rest of this section is based upon "Activating National Plans," in Gross, 
ed., Action under Planning, op. cit. 
37/ The term "cross sectoral" is based upon the proposition that national economic 
planning usually consists of some combination of five kinds of planning: ag-
gregate, cross-sectoral, sectoral or sub-sectoral, enterprise and spatial. This 
proposition is set forth (along with other propositions defining planning pro-
cesses, national planning in particular and national planning in institutions) 
in "What is National Planning?", Gross, ed. Action under Planning, op. cit. 
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69. The nature and intensity of the opposition will depend, of course, upon the 
specific circumstances and upon the degree to which the "injured" interests are or-
ganized. Sectoral and areal plans emerge out of a competition for scarce resources 
by organizations in different sectors and areas. While the distribution of these 
scarce resources among the various sectors and areas provides the wherewithal for 
satisfying certain interests, it inevitably implies — at least in part — the de-
nial of resources to others. The process of resource allocation also has its ne-
gative side — the distribution of dissatisfactions, which inevitably give rise to 
efforts to change official plans or impede their implementation. 
70. Moreover, action based upon new technology always produces serious interest 
conflicts. "Technological change of any significance whatsoever is a threat, real 
or imagined, to the power or security of someone. . . . In its more obvious aspects, 
any technological change which enables the production of similar output with less 
labour threatens "to reduce employment. But even where such an effect can be counterbal-
anced by expanded production or by transfers to other work, the change itself 
threatens established positions and expertise. It renders obsolete the accrued cap-
ital of knowledge in the hands and minds of those who operated in accordance with 
the previous processes. It may even suggest that the people responsible fir the previous 
processes are inferior individuals, as compared with the wiser souls who promote 
the new processes. Furthermore, it may turn upside down the old world of estab-
lished relationships and lead to a complete reorganization of work groups, tasks, 
responsibilities, and individual status." 38/ 
71. Finally, plans for changes in social structure, whether explicit objectives or 
merely corollaries of explicit objectives, lead the planners into the heart of 
deep-felt social conflicts. The limitation of caste or class distinctions, the con— 
trol of monopolies, the regulation of any personal interests, the reorganization of 
industry or agriculture, the promotion of new co-operatives, trade unions or trade 
associations, the "levelling down" of privileged groups, the "levelling up" of the 
underprivileged - all such objectives pit planners against plan opponents. Under 
these circumstances, it is a rare thing if the social conflicts inherent in (or 
provoked by) certain plans for changes in social structure are not reflected to some 
degree in internal competition among the central planners themselves. "The more 
ambitious and dynamic the planning, the sharper this competitive process tends to 
be, and the more far-reaching are the implications for broader conflicts throughout 
the entire social structure." 59/ 
C. Errors by planners 
72. One of the implicit premises underlying the behaviour of many national planners 
is the myth of planners' rationality. Since national planning represents concerted 
effort at the rational allocation of resources in the service of the general 
58/ "People-in-Organizations: Formal Aspects," chapter 15 in Gross, The Managing 
of Organizations, op. cit., p. 355. 
39/ Gross, "National Planning: Findings and Fallacies," op. cit., p. 267. 
welfare, it is often taken for granted that any major decisions or proposals by 
national planners are ipso facto rational. This point of view is supported by po-
litical leaders who must build up their reputation for wisdom, administrators who 
are unwilling to take blame on their own shoulders and technicians eager to sell 
their services. Thus an approved plan is regarded as necessarily good for the 
country. When a plan cannot be carried out, this is no fault of the plan; it is an 
implementation problem. When the planning proposals of technicians are not accepted, 
this merely demonstrates the short-sightedness of administrators and national lead-
ers; the proposals themselves were excellent. So the story goes. 
73. A more mature approach to these problems may be based upon the alternative 
principle that "like everyone else, planners make errors in both substance and me-
thods11 . Indeed, anyone with experience in national planning and the courage to 
examine his experience openly must come to the conclusion that rationality in na-
tional planning is intended rationality. Indeed, the effort to behave rationally, 
as in all processes of human learning, involves trial and error. The more effective 
planners exhibit a willingness to recognize and learn from errors rather than en-
gage in a pretense of infallibility. The saddest cases of failure, as for example 
in agricultural production, are those in which, when a given course of action has 
proved ineffective, the planners try to justify their past by "doing more of the 
same". On the other hand, there are cases in which the national planners seem to 
have learned from their own and others' mistakes, breaking with past policies and 
developing many new approaches, such as the rural public works programmes and the 
use of private enterprises in distributing fertilizer and sinking tube wells as in 
Pakistan. Another fascinating case of adaptability was the giant "villagization" 
programme through which the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964 
committed itself to a plan for relocating hundreds of thousands of people into com-
pact agricultural villages. For a while the Government adhered to this plan, merely 
complaining about the difficulty of getting co-ordination among the many agencies 
dealing with housing, health, agriculture and other specialized aspects of village 
life. Within a year, however, the government leaders recognized that the plan it-
self was undesirable. By the end of 1965 the entire programme was quickly convert-
ed to a small series of pilot projects. 
74. Still more broadly, it is very likely that substantive planning errors are 
being made continuously and on a large-scale basis. Thus, Lauchlin Currie, in his 
new book entitled Accelerating Development, suggests that many economic advisers 
have been guilty of major errors in economic analysis, including the following: 
(a) Ignoring the role of improved income distribution in economic growth; 
(b) Identifying well-being with national income; 
(c) Exaggerating the role of capital investment and capital output ratios, 
thereby contributing to capital waste and underutilization of plant 
capacity; 
(d) Underestimating the importance of putting unemployed labour to work; and 
(e) Seriously underestimating the benefits to be obtained (including the ex-
pansion of demand for locally-produced goods and the training of the 
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labour force) from investing in housing and urban development. 40/ 
75. In view of these errors, Currie believes it very important that certain nation-
al development plans - or certain parts of them - not be implemented. 4-1/ Similarly, 
in Eastern Europe there have been major efforts to uncover and correct previous 
planning failures by making new provisions for more decentralized decision-making. 
Some doctrinaire analysts in Asia and Latin America still have a long way to go in 
matching up with the "new-style socialism" that aims at utilizing market and price 
mechanisms and lightening the burden on the central government's planning officials. 
(See chapter IV-C). 
76. Insofar as methods are concerned, there are certain typical errors that enter 
into what might be called "the administrative pathology of national development 
planning." Among them are the following: 4-2/ 
(a) Document orientation, the tendency of planning technicians to hold that 
"the script's the thing," and not the play, concentrating their attention 
exclusively on memoranda and reports rather than the real-life behaviour 
towards which the documents are supposed to contribute; 
(b) Paper planning, "constructing plans without much critical analysis and 
then assuming the plans to be an accomplished fact", without much atten-
tion to details, intermediate steps or anything but the glory of a Uto-
pian dream; 
(c) Under-evaluation. not getting information on the details of implementation 
and unexpected side-effects or indirect results; 
(d) Over-evaluation, developing evaluating mechanisms that distort the fact-
gathering process, overload the administrative machinery, and provide 
substitutes for action or justification of inaction or bad plans. 
40/ Lauchlin Currie, Accelerating Development: The Necessity and the Means (New 
York: McGraw Hill, 1 9 6 6 ) . This book won the prize offered by the Society for 
Industrial Development for the best book on development in a contest open to 
citizens of all developing countries. Dr. Currie is Director of the Department 
of Economics in the National University of Colombia and of its new Institute 
for Investigations in Development. 
41/ "It is much more important to revise many national plans than to implement them, 
since I feel that many of them are defective in their statement of the problem 
of underdevelopment and the diagnosis of the cause of underdevelopment, in their 
adoption of a growth rate in the G.N.P. per capita as the objective of planning 
and as the criterion of success in development, and hence in their choice of 
strategies and tactics. . . . Therefore, if I am to be logical, I must probably 
say that they should not be implemented:" From a letter of 9 May 1966 by 
Lauchlin Currie to the author. 
42/ These points are taken from "Activating National Plans," in Action under 
Planning, op. cit. 
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D. Slow growth of useful theory 
77. There have been three major currents in the development of serious theory and 
research concerning national planning as a whole: ideological debate, econometric 
technique and empirical analysis. 
78. Ideological debate, sparked by the initiation of the Soviet Union's five-year 
plans in the late 1920's, has consisted of many heated, albeit remarkably abstract, 
controversies on the relation of national planning to "freedom" or "serfdom". 
79. The'development of econometric technique has led to significant advances in 
national economic accounting, input-output analysis, linear programming and compu-
terized models of various economic transactions. It has also helped bring into 
being the fiction of scientific planning. In the effort to attract attention to 
their work and win the support needed for its improvement, the econometricians 
- like the proponents of "scientific management," "administrative science" and 
"management science" - have often capitalized on their use of certain scientific 
methods by exaggerating the extent of their actual scientific achievements. 
80. Since I960, the empirical analysis current has slowly started. In its earliest 
stages, the emphasis has been placed upon economic trends and the evolution of eco-
nomic plans and policies in individual countries. More recent work has been 
broadening to include social, political and cultural variables and to produce com-
parative studies dealing with the experience of many countries. Here there has been 
little pretense of firm scientific findings and, indeed, there has been a marked 
caution against indulgence in "premature prescription". 
81. All in all, there is ample evidence to support the proposition that "the 
scientific basis of national planning is still extremely weak, lagging behind both 
the achievements of natural science and the intuitive wisdom of the best planners". 
While this proposition applies also to the industrialized countries and to the eco-
nomic aspects of national planning, the weakness is most evident in the case of the 
industrializing countries and the administrative aspects of planning. Indeed, many 
of the ideas governing development planning in the industrializing countries have 
been produced by Westerners with little understanding of these societies and still 
less experience with the practice or study of administration. "Few Latin American 
economies," notes Currie, "have received prolonged analysis by outstanding econo-
mists who also understand something of the Art of Getting Things Done." 43/ A si-
milar comment - in still stronger terms - might be applicable to most countries in 
Asia, the Middle East and Africa. 
82. Economic analysis of planning problems, however, is far ahead of the work done 
in other branches of social science. Public administration approaches to the sub-
ject have often been based upon static, formalistic concepts developed in the West 
and not attuned to the realities of dynamic social change. Very little has been 
done to apply to the administration of development planning the new advances in 
business management, organizational theory, and planned social change in formal or-
ganizations and industrial communities. While there have been significant academic 
43/ Currie, Accelerating Development, op. cit., p. 7. 
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advances in the field of comparative government (sometimes mislabeled "comparative 
administration") and political development, outstanding scholars and thinkers in 
these areas have made little direct contact with the concrete problems of adminis-
tering plans for national economic development. 
83. One of the reasons for this slow growth has been the dogmatism and "apologetics" 
evidenced towards national planning in centrally planned and predominantly private 
enterprise countries. 
84. Another reason for the slow growth in fact-based theory and meaningful research 
in the area of national development planning is the complexity of the elements in-
volved. The problems of planned social change in pre-industrial societies are much 
more complex than the problems dealt with by physicists, chemists, biologists and 
engineers. There are many more variables to be dealt with, infinitely greater pro-
blems of quantification and data reliability and almost no opportunities for even 
partially controlled experiments. The varieties of cultural conditions and politi-
cal regimes, combined with serious linguistic barriers, make it extremely difficult 
to identify the unique permutations in which basic variables combine in any one 
country at any one period of time. In short, the process of industrialization, "in-
volving changes in nearly every important inter-personal and inter-group relation-
ship within a society, is probably the most complicated subject man has attempted to 
study and understand". bb/ 
85. Finally, the dominant tendencies in modern science - specialization and empha-
sis on the natural sciences -both militate against progress in this field. With 
increasing specialization, analysts tend to ignore problems in the round and concen-
trate on that particular aspect of a problem that can be neatly classified in their 
special field of interest. Thus an integrated, inter-disciplinary or multi-disci-
plinary approach becomes more necessary and more difficult. The natural sciences 
move ahead with the momentum of a "benign circle," while the social sciences, as a 
whole, suffer from a "vicious circle"• Because of their great achievements, the 
natural sciences receive an increasing share of the world's resources devoted to 
science and technology. Because their output is less dramatic, the social sciences 
receive a declining share of resources. Also, a disproportionate amount of 
scientific activity is devoted to military and para-military purposes. In the in-
dustrializing societies, the volume of scientific investment as a whole is remark-
ably small, while the absolute volume of resources devoted to the social sciences 
- on which progress towards any "science" of national development planning must be 
based - is pathetically small. 
bb/ Irving Swerdlow, "Economics as Part of Development Administration" in Irving 
Swerdlow, ed., Development Administration: Concepts and Problems (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1 9 6 3 ) , P. 1 0 3 . 
- 32 -
IV. IMPLEMENTATION: OPERATING PRINCIPLES 
86. At a certain level of analysis, the major principles necessary for overcoming 
the many obstacles to plan implementation are those dealing with the mobilization and 
use of influence. 
87. Thus, in the discussion of the administrator as an integrating generalist, 
reference has been made to the process of mobilizing various interests (inside and 
outside of government) into an "activation" or "support" base. In a similar vein, 
attention must also be given to the strategies and tactics of the following: 
(a) Combining various types of persuasion and pressure into an 
~~ "activation mix" appropriate to a given situation; 
(b) Managing conflict in such a way as to achieve acceptable compro-
— mises and integration of conflicting interests, with little avoid-
ance, deadlock or defeat; and 
(c) Conducting action campaigns under conditions of considerable risk 
— and uncertainty. 
88. In this context, accordingly, it is more relevant to concentrate on a number 
of concrete administrative operations which,while they all touch upon the processes 
of mobilizing support, using influence, managing conflict and conducting campaigns, 
are somewhat more technical and conventional in nature. 
A. Budgeting: The new "systems analysis" 
89. "Since annual budgets are the principal means by which governments authorize 
and control most of their expenditures, most outlays provided for in the public sec-
tor portion of a development plan must be incorporated into these budgets if the 
plan is to be carried out. . . . A government's budget is therefore a key element 
in converting a development plan into a programme for action. these words 
Albert Waterston has expressed one of the operating axioms of economic development. 
90. The difficulty with budgeting for economic development, however, is that the 
government budgeting techniques inherited from colonial days have been defective. 
Budgetary reform, on the other hand, has often been inspired by people with the most 
formalistic ideas of both development and administration. At its worst, it has been 
hindered by superficial considerations of comprehensiveness and classification. At 
its best, it has been concerned primarily with budgetary faddism. One of the most 
popular budgetary fads in the past has been performance or programme budgeting. The 
basic idea behind programme or performance budgeting has been that a meaningful gov-
ernment budget should not be limited to a listing of the "inputs" (or resources) to 
be used -- in budget terminology often referred to as "items" or "objects" of expen-
diture. Rather, it should also list the "outputs", that is, the services or facili-
ties to be provided through the use of such resources. Yet in the United States, 
45/ Waterston, Development Planning, op. cit., p. 201. 
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where this new approach originated., insufficient attention was given to the complex 
problems involved in providing useful information on either input or output. Indeed, 
between the late nineteen forties and the early nineteen sixties, the subject was 
approached without any serious effort to define basic terms. "Programme" and "per-
formance" budgeting became catchwords, with budget "experts" who had not done very 
well with it at home attempting to install it in industrializing countries. 
91- It was not until the new "budgeting revolution" in the United States Depart-
ment of Defense (1961-65) that the ideas were operationally refined. The successes 
in using the new methods to achieve more efficient procurement and delivery of mili-
tary goods^led the President to instruct the Bureau of the Budget to install the 
same system throughout the federal establishment. In August 19^5, President Johnson 
announced that the United States Government would "begin to introduce a new planning-
programming-budgeting system . . . ."}£]? This new plan depends for its success on the 
adaptation of the techniques developed for Defense Department purposes to the more 
intangible services of other federal agencies, and to aid to local, state or foreign 
governments. Its success also depends upon converting "old line" budgetary personnel 
into experts in programme planning and administration — a long and difficult process 
Competent observers agree that the plc.r.ning-pro;;ramming budgeting system will 
not be in serious operation in half the agencies of the United States Government be-
fore 1970. 
92. In the meantime, it may be confidently predicted that some of the most pro-
gressive governments among the industrializing nations will seek to apply the new 
"systems analysis" to their own complex problems of budgeting for planned economic 
development. It may also .be predicted that efforts will be made to introduce some of 
the planning-progracming budgeting system concepts in the very form in which they 
have emanated from the United States Department of Defense without recognition of the 
many fundamental changes being made in them by civilian administrators or the still 
more fundamental changes needed to adapt them to the needs of developing nations. 
This is a typical problem in "keeping up" with technological change. 
k6/ The success of these managerial methods in broader areas -- such as the 
actual use of military goods in military operations -- is open to serious 
question. Indeed, with public available information bearing almost entirely 
on their use with respect to procurement and delivery, one may speculate 
whether they have in fact been attempted at all in the more important areas 
of performance by the United States defence establishment. 
kl/ Quoted by Charles L. Schultze, Director, Bureau of the Budget, in his fore-
word to David Novick, ed. Program Budgeting (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1965>. This book (an abridgement of a larger 
volume prepared by the Rand Corporation and published by the Harvard Univer-
sity Press), emphasizes "the structural and information portrayal aspect of 
the total system envisioned by the President". It has become the standard 
reference of advocates of the planning-programming budgeting system.• . 
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93. As a starting point for those trying to cope with this problem, the following 
principle may be enunciated: "The budgeting of government plans should be based upon 
an appraisal of (a) the direct and indirect benefits likely to be obtained from 
(b) identifiable outputs (or services J to be provided by the use of realistically 
estimated inputs (costs)". The compelling logic buried under the verbiage with which 
the planning - pro(3ramming budgeting system is described is that it is a "benefit-
output-cost" system. This is very close to what was previously called "cost-benefit" 
analysis, but with two important changes. First, it is now realized that costs (or 
the use of inputs) do not directly lead to benefits. Rather, the costs reflect the 
inputs used in producing certain outputs (such as health services, educational ser-
vices, dams, buildings, regulations, etc.). The justification of these outputs is 
that they provide certain benefits, such as malaria eradication, literacy and tech-
nical skill, water for irrigation, shelter, and safe working conditions in factories. 
Thus the word "output" must be inserted between "cost" and "benefit". Second, the 
major emphasis must be on "benefits". To neglect them (and this is easy to do, since 
information on benefits is always more controversial and often more intangible than 
any other budgetary information) is to take a narrow "cost-accounting" viewpoint, 
whereby attention may be directed to doing more economically things that should not 
be done at all. Moreover, even according to basic economic doctrine, costs are mere-
ly foregone benefits. Hence the desirability of formulating the new approach to bud-
geting in terms of "benefit-output-cost" analysis. This places more emphasis on the 
comparison of alternative benefits through alternative output patterns. 
94. One of the major tasks of public administration during the next few years --
a task of profound importance for the administration of economic development plans 
in industrializing nations --is the development and testing of concepts and tech-
niques relating to each of these three elements: benefits, outputs, costs. 
B. Projects: Promotion and review 
95- The consideration of improved budgeting leads us at once to the preparation 
and review of projects. Here we find what ¥aterston of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) refers to as a "project gap", namely, a serious 
shortage of well-prepared projects relative to the funds available to finance good 
projects. "Foreign and international lending and donor agencies, which generally are 
unwilling to commit funds for projects which are not based on sound preinvestment and 
other studies, are frequently hard put to find enough well-prepared projects to help 
finance in less developed countries."42/ Moreover, projects for which financing is 
obtained often turn out to be somewhat disappointing. One of the technicians with 
considerable experience at the project level finds the following: 
Buildings left unfinished for lack of funds; new factories 
operating at only a fraction of capacity and at substantial losses; 
costly machinery and equipment idle for want of spare parts; water-
storage dams washed out because of poor engineering or inadequate 
48/ Some of the basic concepts needed for this work have been set forth with 
illustrative detail in The Managing of Organizations, op. cit.: (a) on ben-
efits in "Satisfaction of Interests" (chapter 20); (b) on output in "Output: 
Services and Goods", "Output: Quality and Quantity", and "Output: Operations 
and Functions" (chapters 21, 22 and 23) j and (c) on costs in "Efficiency and 
Profitability" (chapter 24). 
49/ Waterston, Development Planning, op. cit., p. 325. 
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design data; farm lands excessively salinated "because of too 
liberal water use from new irrigation facilities and inadequate 
drainage; new schools without desks or teachers; delicate com-
munications equipment spoiling in poorly protected warehouses 
for want of buildings in which to install it; crop improvement 
projects spoiled because of inadequate protection against cross-
pollination or through misuse of distributed seeds; hospitals 
without drugs, equipment or nurses — such examples are perhaps 
more typical than uncommon. Many, perhaps most of them are due 
to poor project planning.50/ 
96. To some extent, such situations are the result of the widespread fallacy of 
projections without projects. This fallacy takes two forms: macro and micro. The 
macro-fallacy consists of the belief that "aggregate" macro-economic quantities may 
serve as useful development targets apart from specific enterprise, sectoral and 
cross-sectoral plans that may be aggregated.51 / This belief, fostered by various vi-
gorous salesmen of highly mathematical econometrics, serves to hold back rather than 
promote progress in econometrics (which has great potentialities in providing the 
analytical background for the development of more meaningful enterprise, sectoral and 
cross-sectoral plans). The micro-fallacy, in turn, consists of the belief that spe-
cific economic and engineering projections on paper will provide a project plan. 
This belief leads to "feasibility studies" based on technical factors alone and paper 
projects that ignore administrative, political and cultural realities. 
97. Accordingly, one of the key principles of development administration is that 
"Central planners should promote the formulation and review of large numbers of spe-
cific development projects in terms of the relevant technical, financial, administra-
tive, political and cultural considerations". Waterston expresses this principle in 
his advice that development planners "build up and maintain a 'stock' of well-prepar-
ed projects from which a suitable variety and number can be selected to provide a 
steady flow of new projects to be added to those already in process of execution."52/ 
Towards this end he urges sectoral studies that will help identify as early as possi-
ble promising projects in each sector.j?̂ / He refers to the Pakistani experience in 
this connexion: 
" in Pakistan, over 100 project and programme feasibility 
studies, besides a number of important sector surveys, were carried 
through at the same time in a specially organized "crash programme". 
The programme was inaugurated early in the Second Plan period to 
build up a stock of projects for the latter part of the Second, and 
especially, for the Third Plan period. The availability of a large 
number of projects "ready to go" not only has made it possible for 
Pakistan to obtain increased foreign aid, but also helps account for 
its success in. fulfillingr.and exceeding-its plan targets. "5V 
Louis J. Walinsky, The Planning and Execution of Economic Development 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1 9 ^ 3 ), p. 7 3 -
An estimate of national output arrived at by applying some assumed ratio 
between incremental investment and total output has not been aggregated by 
adding up outputs in each sector of production. There is therefore something 
misleading in calling it an "aggregate" that may then be "disaggregated". The 
term "artificial aggregate" would be more appropriate. 
Waterston, Development Planning, op. cit., p. 35^. 
Ibid. 





98. Two additional corollaries to the above principle must be mentioned. First, 
the central planners cannot sit back and merely review projects developed by minis-
tries, government corporations and others. In many cases, there will be nothing 
worth reviewing; and the allocation of high-quality personnel to central review may 
merely serve to demoralize the ill-staged organizations whose proposals are being 
reviewed. It is much more important to take specific steps to promote the formula-
tion of projects worth reviewing. 
99- Second, private sector projects require review as well as promotion. It is 
not enough, as Waterston seems to suggest, to concentrate on "providing suitable 
incentives to private investors and eliminating administrative, legal and other regu-
lations and procedures which tend to dampen the interest of domestic and foreign 
investors" .2/ Private firms, including the most technically competent native and 
foreign companies, have often proved remarkably adept at devising attractive projects 
which have resulted in large-scale subsidies to private interests with little social 
benefit or even at the cost of large, indirect losses of scarce foreign currency. 
C. Market administration 
100. One of the most promising developments among the industrializing nations is 
the growing awareness of the desirability of economic development planning through 
greater use of markets and price systems. Experience has repeatedly proved that 
there are serious limits on the quantity and type of decisions that can be made by 
government planners. Implementation, as well as the formulation of desirable plans, 
in the first instance, require decentralization of decision-making beyond the formal 
government apparatus. As Charles Lindblom has recently pointed out, markets and 
price systems may in many circumstances provide useful instruments for effectuating 
such d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . ¿ 6 / ijhe government apparatus, with less of a burden to carry 
on its own shoulders, will be better able to do its own job. 
101. Unfortunately, both action and discussion in this area have been impeded by 
a curious laissez faire illusion. On the one hand, various proponents of a larger 
public sector mistakenly equate the use of market and price systems with the laissez 
faire views of Adam Smith and the old-fashioned "classical" opposition to government 
intervention in market operations. This viewpoint is supported by the old-fashioned 
"doctrinaire socialists", who have not yet caught up with the new wave of experimen-
tation in Eastern Europe in the manipulation of markets and price systems by govern-
ments with centrally planned economies. On the other hand, over-enthusiastic propo-
nents of the use of market and price systems have sometimes gone to the extreme of 
suggesting --or seeming to suggest -- that these systems be allowed to operate on 
their own. While advocating more effective styles of government intervention, some 
have even tried to use terminology that would give old-fashioned Western business 
interests the impression they were advocating less government intervention. 
55/ Waterston, Development Planning, op. cit., p. 353. 
56/ Charles E. Lindblom, "Economics and the Administration of National Planning", 
Public Administration Review," December 1965. 
- 37 -
102. Yet despite both versions of the laissez faire illusion, it may be stated 
rather firmly that "The effective decentralization of decision-making through markets 
and price systems requires highly developed skills in market administration". These 
skills involve: 
(a) Fiscal, monetary and credit policies (both general and selective) 
that promote the growth of private and mixed organizations; 
(b) The promotion and control of foreign investing and lending; 
(c) The imposition and/or liberalization or removal of foreign currency 
controls, import controls and excises; 
(d) Government buying and selling to promote or stabilize markets; 
(e) The imposition of various kinds of minimum, maximum or fixed prices; 
(f) Other forms of direct and indirect market and price regulation; and 
(g) The provision of market information and other kinds of data needed 
by buyers, sellers and investors. 
103- All these activities are forms of intervention ratherthan non-intervention. 
They are "non" only to the extent that they facilitate a smaller burden of direct 
operating and managing responsibilities on the hands of government agencies. At the 
same time, they represent difficult and delicate government operations. They thus 
comprise a sphere of government decision-making which, if successfully handled, may 
result in a broadening volume of private decision-making that serves public interests 
To escape any implication that it involves laissez faire, this field may well be 
called "market administration". 
D. Information collection and distribution 
104. One of the major contributions of modern national planning has been to pro-
vide an informational basis for important government decisions. In fact, informa-
tion is the life blood of all planning. Without it, planners cannot know how to pro-
ceed. The planning process, moreover, seems to generate an endless need for more 
and better information. The more they get involved in development planning, the more 
both national leaders and top administrators (not merely planning technicians) re-
quire data. Thus, in the two countries with the most elaborate statistical machinery 
in the world, the USSR and the United States of America, there is increasing dissat-
isfaction with available data and the way it is used. Soviet planners are involved 
in a general reorganization of statistical collection, geared into a nation-wide sys-
tem of computerized collection, processing, retrieval and distribution._57/ In the 
United States, the new budgeting system in the planning-programming budgeting 
system era is oriented mainly towards obtaining more and better information, not 
merely on inputs and outputs, but also on the benefits enjoyed by various groups in 
society as a result of government programmes. This moves the Federal Government 
N.I. Kovalev, "The Problems in Introducing Mathematics and Electronic 
Computers in Planning", Problems of Economics, Vol. 5, Wo. k, August 1962. 
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towards new efforts, not only to improve its economic statistics, but also to contem-
plate revolutionary steps in obtaining non-economic data on American society. This 
new orientation is evidenced in the preliminary planning now under way for a new 
Social Report of the President (to complement the present basic national planning 
documents in the United States: the President's Economic Report and Budget Message) 
or for a comprehensive "State of the Union" message or set of messages. An indica-
tion of the new statistical work needed to do this is provided by Raymond A. Bauer's 
new Social Indicators58/prepared under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences. 
105. Against this background, we face the fact -- documented again and again by 
countless reports of the United Nations, the Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East (ECAFE), the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) -- that all industrializing countries suffer from a seri-
ous shortage of the most elementary statistical data as the basis for formulating, 
activating and evaluating economic development plans. It takes many decades to 
develop systematic and reliable statistical series. Ad hoc surveys and fact-finding 
inquiries by expert groups are costly and time-consuming. Valuable information tends 
to be jealously guarded by people and agencies anxious to enhance their power by a 
data monopoly. Publicly available information tends to be embodied in documents that 
few people know about or which are "lost in the files". As Oskar Morge.nstern has 
pointed out, some of the "facts" and estimates most widely in use suffer from appal-
lingly large margins of error. 59/ Moreover, as Waterston has pointed out, "scarce 
professional talent can also be misused in the collection of data for, and the pre-
paration of, input-output matrices, a favorite instrument of planning experts from 
the more advanced countries. . . . quite a few less-developed countries have construc-
ted input-output tables of their economies, although it would be hard to find one 
which has made effective use of them for planning purposes". 60/ What Waterston knows, 
but does not mention, is that the ritualistic elaboration of econometric projections 
stems from a dangerous faith in the number magic of figures without facts. "Imputa-
tion" and estimates often based upon little except the desire to provide a dramatic 
illustration of certain ideas, are the bases for many of the so-called "figures" 
used by econometricians. While such practices may advance the professional careers 
of native technicians, they often tend to alienate them from the realities of econo-
mic development at home and distract attention from the need for the more sober and 
less dramatic collection of some simple facts. 
58/ Raymond A. Bauer, ed. Social Indicators (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 
1966). 
59/ Oskar Morganstern, The Accuracy of Economic Observations (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1963). 
60J Waterston, Development Planning, op. cit., pp. 191-192. 
6l/ Econometricians are often much more interested in the abstract relations 
among variables than in the specific data necessary to describe these varia-
bles or in the painstaking non-mathematical tasks of definition and collec-
tion necessary to obtain such data. In this sense, while purporting to be 
interested mainly in quantitative analysis, they often have little apprecia-
tion of, or respect for, the problems of handling quantitative data. 
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106. Accordingly, another "basic principle is that "Effective development planning 
requires the painstaking collection and widespread distribution of strategic informa-
tion" . This principle requires particular attention from development administrators. 
First of all, they should take seriously Waterston's recommendation that "it would be 
useful to include in each national development plan a program or blueprint for expan-
ding and improving the statistical and other data needed only to formulate and imple-
ment the next plan. The statistician or other fact-finder must always be ahead of 
the planner if he is to provide the planner with information when it is required. . . 
A blueprint for statistical betterment related specifically to the next plan would be 
much more modest than most proposals to overhaul the statistical apparatus and prac-
tices prevailing in less-developed countries" .HiL/ 
107. Second, development administrators cannot afford to allow statistical needs 
to be formulated by any one set of technicians. Economists often tend to over-empha-
size national accounting estimates. Statisticians tend to over-emphasize the improve-
ment of data in separate sectors. Both usually neglect social and sociological data. 
The only way to make a strategic selection of priorities is to use some general model 
of all the different kinds of information relevant to accelerated change in a society 
and its environment. This requires some form of "social systems accounting", as out-
lined in preliminary form in The State of the Nation. Although it will take at 
least another decade before social systems accounting can become operational in many 
countries, one practical step can be taken without much delay: the preparation of 
annual reports in which the Chief Executive (whether Prime Minister or President) 
gives the legislature and the nation a comprehensive picture of problems, progress 
and retrogression on all important fronts. This would be one of the greatest single 
advances in the technique of national development planning. 
108. Third, in developing information-flow systems, administrators should build 
and promote multiple channels for the flow of information. This is particularly im-
portant with respect to "feedback" information on what has actually been happening. 
As already pointed out (at the end of chapter III C ), the danger of "under-evalua-
tion" may often be countered by equally harmful "over-evaluation". In a simple-
minded, over-hierarchical fashion, too much information may be channelled to central 
government offices and top administrators, with too little information moving to the 
places where people can have the time to absorb it, the familiarity to understand it 
and the opportunity to act directly on the basis of it. Indeed, official government 
channels can never suffice. As development progresses and the volume and complexity 
of information flows become greater, the channels provided by a competitive press, 
parliamentary discussions, professional journals, international media and face-to-
face conferences and meetings become increasingly important. 
E. Administrative research and development 
109. The entire modern world suffers from an imbalance between technological ad-
vance, on the one hand, and institutional and social change, on the other hand. To 
some extent, this imbalance is associated with -- both as cause and effect -- the 
62/ Waterston, Development Planning, op. cit., pp. 194—195• 
65/ The nature of such planning reports by a chief executive is touched upon in 
Gross, The State of the Nation, op. cit. and developed in greater detail, 
with special reference to one country only, in Gross, "Let's Have a Real 
State of the Union Message", Challenge, May/june, 1966. 
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imbalance between the tremendous support given the natural sciences and the hard-
goods technology, on the one hand, and the "starvation diet" made available to social 
scientists. The sad implications of this for development planning and development 
administration have already been discussed in chapter H I D. 
110. Unfortunately, the fallacy of hard science research seems to pervade the 
offices of planning administrators and technicians. Agricultural, engineering, trans-
portation research is more essential to these administrators than research on plan-
ning itself and the administration of planning, which might not provide immediate 
results. Furthermore, if it did, it might call for embarrassment or painful changes 
in organizational structure or administrative methods of behaviour. One of the by-
products of this situation is the existence of many training programmes without the 
training materials that could be provided only by serious research. 
111. Nevertheless, almost all planners will support the principle that "More 
effective development planning requires an increase in research and theory, both 
basic and applied, both specialized and interdisciplinary, on planning problems and 
processes." To carry out this principle, however, a number of important steps must 
be taken. First of all, there should be a substantial increase in the funds made 
available for research. Thus far, the United Nations and other agencies have been 
expected to produce too much with regard to the provision of expert advice and the 
conducting of training activities -- too much, that is, in relation to the unsatis-
factory research-theory basis for such advice and training. 
112. Second, much greater use should be made of universities, research institu-' 
tions and full-time research staffs in conducting international research on planning 
and planning administration. There is a definite limit to what can be accomplished 
by ad hoc meetings of experts and by detailed questionnaires mailed to government 
agencies in various countries. A sober examination of many "studies" completed or 
in process might well indicate that this limit has too often been reached. 
113- Third, closer co-operative relations are needed between objective researchers 
and planning administrators. On the one hand, more national planning agencies should 
be willing to provide "access" and other assistance to serious researchers. A good 
example is provided by the extensive assistance now being provided by the planning 
authorities in India, Pakistan, Venezuela and Kenya to a group of researchers engaged 
in a comparative study of the building of national planning systems.64/ On the other 
hand, national planners themselves -- on the basis of their own extensive experience— 
should be given more opportunities to escape the "planning struggle" and engage in 
research and theory on the basis of their valuable experiences. 
F. Training for top administrators 
114. National development planners generally recognize the tremendous importance 
of education and training programmes to provide thorough social reconstruction. More 
specifically, they have made provisions for training and education in business and 
public administration. They have recognized the need for the training and education 
of young economists and other technicians. 
64/ This project is part of the Inter-University Program on Institution Building, 
conducted with the help of the Ford Foundation by the University of Pitts-
burgh, Indiana University, Michigan State University and Syracuse University. 
- hi -
115. To a large extent, however, the national planners have operated in accordance 
with the comfortable doctrine of education for other people. They have not distin-
guished themselves "by action in accordance with the principle that "Planners too 
must learn". 
Il6. A preliminary report by the International Group for Studies in National 
Planning (iNTERPLAN), still being worked on by planning administrators in many coun-
tries, develops this theme of "Planners too must learn" in greater detail: 
Even an abundant supply of economic technicians — senior as well 
as junior -- will not provide the range of skills and knowledge needed 
to formulate sound plans, implement them and adjust them to meet new 
conditions. This point is increasingly recognized at the level of the 
individual enterprise, where general management training is rapidly 
expanding. This point should also be recognized by the central agencies 
of government -- the chief executives and their aides, the specialized 
planning and economic advisory boards and commissions and the central 
agencies of financial management. To develop a general atmosphere of 
creativity and innovation, the central guidance cluster leaders should 
set a personal example. They should demonstrate that they are interested 
in developing their own abilities, knowledge and interests. 657 
The draft INTERPLAN report then goes on to suggest various types of courses, seminars 
and workshops to meet the needs not only of specialists, but also of leaders of 
interdisciplinary teams, top executives, political leaders, and interest group 
leaders. These proposals will be reviewed and revised on the basis of critiques by 
planning officials in many countries and of discussion at the INTERPLAN conference 
in November 1 9 6 6 ^ 
G. "Trans-boundary" dialogue 
117- It is a well-accepted principle that formal and informal conferences, osten-
sibly arranged for the mere exchange of information or the preparation of proposals, 
perform invaluable training and education functions. Too many of these conferences, 
however, are vitiated by the fiction of discussion without communication. At inter-
national conferences serious barriers to meaningful discussions are created whenever 
the participants are supposed to "represent" their countries. This slowly but surely 
puts them in the position of defending established positions rather than joining with 
people in other countries in the mutual exploration of mutual problems and the frank 
discussion of common failures. Moreover, there are few conferences, whether inter-
national or purely domestic, that bring together specialists from different disci-
plines. There are still fewer in which political leaders, administrators and specia-
lists all meet and discuss problems together. 
65./ International Group for Studies in National Planning (iNTERPLAN). The 
Development of National Planning Personnel, a preliminary report based on 
the 20-24- April 1965 conference of INTERPLAN in Warsaw at the invitation of 
the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Science. 
66J The next INTERPLAN conference on the implementation of national planning will 
be held in Caracas, Venezuela, 15-22 November 1966, at the invitation of 
Venezuela's Central Office of Co-ordination and Planning (CORDIPLAN). 
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118. To combat these separatist tendencies, more action should be based on the 
principle that "Planners need more opportunities for informal and continuing dialogue 
across national, disciplinary and 'position' or 'rank' boundaries"" Various United 
Nations agencies have already made tremendous progress in providing opportunities to 
transcend national boundaries. Much still remains to be done, however, in develop-
ing more effective dialogues across the boundaries of disciplines between planning 
technicians and planning administrators and between national leaders and. both admin-
istrators and technicians. It is likely that such dialogues are only possible in the 
informal atmosphere of non-official conferences and workshops. 
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V. MACHINERY FOR PLANNING 
119. Any hopes for getting results through economic development planning are apt 
to he frustrated without appropriate administrative machinery. 
120. Yet the development of appropriate machinery, that is, the complex array of 
organizations and institutions involved in plan formulation and implementation, is 
extremely difficult. It requires certain delicate and sensitive adaptations in the 
central machinery of national government. It demands a pragmatic flexibility based 
more upon an interest in results than in abstract commitment to structural forms. 
It calls for continuing reorganization to meet new conditions and promote new and 
more creative policies and activities. 
A. Central guidance clusters 
121. As this writer has stated in another context: 
"Modern administrative theory has clearly recognized that in single 
organizations, whether public or private, the administrative pro-
cesses of planning, activating (or in older terminology "direct-
ing") and evaluating are interwoven at all hierarchical levels. 
In particular, all the higher organs of management play vital 
roles in planning . . . At the level of a nation also the special-
ized planning units account for only a very small part of the 
national economic planning that actually takes place. They tend 
to concentrate upon certain research functions involving the anal-
ysis of general economic trends and the formulation of proposals 
to be decided upon by others. . . . Nor are they even the coordi-
nators of national economic policy and programs. In fact, their 
specific functions are extremely varied and it is impossible to 
determine what these functions really are - or should be - without 
seeing them as an integral part of the complex network of many or-
gans at the center of national government". 67/ 
122. Yet any single central planning agency, whether it be called a commission, 
council or ministry, serves such important symbolic and ceremonial purposes that it 
may be mistakenly regarded as the planning agency. Indeed, in many countries a 
central planning organ illusion has already come into being. This illusion is embed-
ded in and it helps propagate widespread and deeply cherished myths of central omni-
potence. According to these myths, any organization or social system is run by a 
single individual or small group who simply issues commands that are binding on 
67/ Bertram M. Gross, "The Managers of National Economic Change", in Roscoe C. 
Martin, ed. Public Administration and Democracy: Essays in Honor of Paul H. 
Appleby (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965), pp. 115-116. 
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others. 68/ At the level of a nation as a whole, the myths of central omnipotence 
are particularly powerful. The very idea of national planning often originates in 
a deep urge to find a guiding hand to bring order out of social chaos. National 
leaders seeking somewhat greater power need dramatic symbols to increase the power 
they already have or to detract attention from themselves by using the specialized 
planning agencies as lightning rods to attract opposition and resentment. They may 
even exaggerate the power of a planning commission or planning ministry in order to 
use it later as a sacrificial scapegoat that can be publicly liquidated or reorgan-
ized whenever a new economic crisis develops. 
123. To counteract the central planning organ illusion, the organizational basis of 
national planning should be approached in terms of the following principle: 
Effective development planning requires a cluster of central 
government agencies performing various roles not only in the pro-
vision of specialized and general staff services but also in na-
tional leadership, financial management and the handling of criti-
cal problems. 
124. The special staff roles include (a) trend analysis; (b) goal analysis; (c) po-
licy analysis; and (d) major project analysis. Most special economic staffs provide 
the first two of these. The more effective ones concentrate upon the last two, with 
trend analysis and goal analysis used as instruments for doing better work in con-
nexion with policies and projects. The same four categories, it should be noted, 
are applicable to specialized staff work by experts in administration, sociology, 
social psychology and political science. By and large, however, staff services of 
this type have rarely been provided in terms that relate to development planning. 
This may be attributed not so much to the economists' monopoly in the field of na-
tional planning, as to the relative backwardness of the other disciplines (as com-
pared with economics) and the failure of plan administrators to involve these other 
disciplines in the planning process. The general staff roles include (a) providing 
communication links among vital centres of power and expertise; (b) bargaining and 
negotiating among diverse groups; (c) evaluating Performance an¿ (¿) helping break 
bottlenecks and perform other functions necessary for expediting action. Many eco-
nomists, it might be noted, have developed impressive capacities for performing 
these non-economic functions. 
125. Both special and general staff services are particularly important in helping 
to strengthen and support general leadership roles. These are the indispensable 
roles played by chief executives, prime ministers, formal cabinets and interdepart-
mental cabinet committees, formal councils representing major power groups in a 
68/ See Victor Thompson, Modern'Organization, op. cit. pp. 10, 95, for a penetrat-
ing discussion of the "primitive monistic ideal" that allows adults in organ-
izations to duplicate childhood experiences or subordination to, and dependence 
on, an all-powerful parent. This subject is also discussed in Gross, The 
Managing of Organizations, op. cit. "The Dispersion of Power in Organizations" 
chapter 3, pp. 49-72. 
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country, informal control groups, and personal advisers to top national leaders. 
126. In addition, no matter what their formal relation to specialized planning 
agencies, "central financial institutions always play a tremendous role in the for-
mulation and implementation of national economic plans. This role is rooted in the 
tremendous significance of money as a claim against resources, in the political as 
well as the economic significance of budgetary, monetary and lending decisions, and 
in the administrative significance of accounting and auditing operations. It is 
strengthened by the fact that financial agencies are often the oldest and most re-
doubtable of government bureaucracies with an influential network of local offices 
scattered across a country. Where these agencies are not well-developed, there is 
an institutional gap that cannot be filled". 69/ These financial management roles 
may be divided not only between a finance ministry (or treasury) and a central bank, 
but also among the separate units of those agencies dealing with expenditures, cur-
rent budgets, development of capital budgets and foreign currency budgets. In ad-
dition, there are often one or more separate national development banks or corpora-
tions handling government loans and investments in various sectors. 
127. Finally, there are the strategically important and, at times, decisive roles 
played by defence ministries, national water boards or other agencies with special 
responsibilities for handling critical problems affecting the entire country. 
128. Accordingly, it should be perfectly clear that "no single agency could ever 
handle all the many roles involved in the guidance of national economic change. 
They are too numerous, specialized and different to be embodied in any single orga-
nization. Any effort to incorporate them all in a single organization would inevi-
tably lead to such a large amount of subdivision as to convert the boundaries of the 
total organization into a formal façade. The subdivisions would become de facto 
formal organizations". 70/ The problem of organization and reorganization, there-
fore, becomes one of designing a complex cluster of interlocking agencies and seeing 
to it that there are qualified persons to fill all important roles. 
B. Building innovating action organizations 
129. One of the ciangprs of taking o]d-fa£hicned eccranic analysis, too seriously is its con-
centration upon the so-called factors of production - land, labour and capital - as 
the source of economic growth. Its most extreme form is the nonsensical proposition 
- no less ridiculous when presented in terms of mathematical equations unrelated to 
empirical data - that there could or should be a stable relation between incremental 
investment and production. 71/ This oversimplification has been partially 
69/ Gross, "The Managers of National Economic Change", op. cit.. p. 109. 
70/ Ibid.. p. 114. 
71/ The fallacies in the capital-output approach to development, which is still the 
"conventional wisdom" among economists, have been brilliantly exposed by 
Lauchlin Currie in "The Capital Formation Approach", chapter 9, Accelerating 
Development (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 121-139. 
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counteracted by the recent discovery of "human capital" and "investment in people" 
through expenditures on such things as education and health. 72/ 
130. Yet both the "hard goods" concept of investment and "investment in people" are 
illustrations of the atomistic illusion. The former looks at machinery abstracted 
from the people who use it, the latter at people in their capacity as single indivi-
duals. Each overlooks the fundamental fact that the goods and services needed for 
human progress cannot be produced by machinery alone or by educated, healthy people 
acting individually. The separate "factors of production" become "productive" in 
fact only when brought together in an organization. It is in this sense that the 
industrial revolution of the nineteenth century was an organizational revolution. 
Similarly, the key to development by the presently industrializing countries is 
another organizational revolution. One of the most important principles of develop-
ment is that "Capital and people can be effectively used only by building the orga-
nizations or institutions with the capacity to use them". 
131. The need for building greater organizational capacity at the very centre of 
government, that is, in the central guidance cluster, has been discussed. The key 
agencies in this cluster, or complex, however, can never be very effective unless 
they can rely upon a large array of government ministries, public corporations and 
other action agencies to carry on specific programmes, policies and projects. Thus, 
another role may be added to those mentioned in the previous subsection - the role 
of building action agencies. Indeed, they should see this role as some of the most 
effective planners already see it - as that of creating organization-building minis-
tries and corporations. 
132. In part, the process of building an organization always requires setting up 
totally new agencies. No change from an administration designed mainly to maintain 
"law and order" to one designed to accelerate economic growth has ever been 
achieved totally within the framework of traditional institutions. But to build an 
organization effectively also requires the adaptation and reinvigoration of old-
line agencies, whether through new leadership, new personnel, reorganization, or the 
competition created by new agencies. There is a limit on how many new agencies can 
be established within a given period of time. There are tremendous values to be 
gained by harnessing the capacities and unleashing the often repressed energy and 
imagination of certain people in the traditional bureaucracy. 
133. One of the secrets of successful organization building is a pragmatic, non-
doctrinaire approach to the legal status of organizations. With a little encourage-
ment and help, private companies can often handle many tasks far better than govern-
ment agencies. Indeed, one of the most important tasks of national planners is to 
build up private enterprises capable of both genuine initiative and public responsi-
bility (as discussed above in chapter IV C) At the same time, public corporations 
and mixed enterprises may sometimes show far greater initiative and enterprise. 
Although the innovating "bureaucratic enterpreneur" has been neglected in the 
72/ See particularly Theodore Schultz, "Investment in Human Capital", American 
Economic Review. Vol. 68, 1961, pp. 1-17« This approach has also been applied 
to industrializing countries in a number of books by Frederick Harbison. 
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literature of economic development and public administration, he is already becoming 
an important phenomenon in the industrializing world. 
134. Another secret of successful organization building, as revealed in the practice 
of almost every industrializing country, is to spot the creative individuals and 
groups with initiative and ability and provide them with the resources and encourage-
ment needed for growth. The resultant growth may be unruly and unpredictable, but 
this is a small price to pay in a cultural environment in which the "islands of 
initiative" may be few and far between. Indeed, success in building innovating ac-
tion agencies is not to be judged by the existence of a well-co-ordinated organiza-
tion that can be neatly arranged on an organization chart. The "pay off" is the 
actual progress made in such things as producing and distributing fertilizer, car-
rying out irrigation and power programmes, carrying out land reforms that result in 
greater, rather than lesser, agricultural output and producing industrial goods 
that can replace imports or be sold abroad. When such progress is made, it will 
usually be through the work of action organizations that are not readily susceptible 
to quick and easy co-ordination by central government agencies. It is usually the 
outcome of action by central government planners who have the good judgement to 
realize that it is more important in the early stages of development to promote 
agencies with the capacity to resist central co-ordination than to waste their time 
co-ordinating agencies with little capacity to get anything done. 
C. Private and community participation 
135. One of the great discoveries of "human relations" researchers in administra-
tive theory has been that greater participation in decision-making seems to result 
in improved output. At the national level, "participative planning" has been popu-
larized by the achievements of French national planning in the 1950's and early 
I960's. Although the French national planners also made vigorous use of governmen-
tal measures to promote expansion by specific enterprises, they have also operated 
on the widely-advertised principle of "the participation in policy-making of those 
who will have to bear the brunt of the implementation of measures decided upon". 75/ 
Such participation, at the level of both the organization and the nation, is proper-
ly regarded as a step forward towards greater democracy in a world in which the re-
presentative democracy of parliamentary institutions is no longer sufficient to 
give people enough participation in the complex decisions affecting their lives and 
futures. 
136. Yet the new attention to participation has also given rise to the bluffs of 
"facade democracy". Ekrticipatrvetechniques "are often used to provide ritualistic 
rather than genuine participation. Planners may merely want to give private groups 
the sense of participation in order to manipulate them into accepting as their own 
predetermined decisions and plans. Similarly, many representatives on consultative 
committees, both intra- and inter-organizational, are mainly interested in the pres-
tige accruing to themselves or their constituents through symbolic rather than• 
73/ Bertram M. Gross, "Activating National Plans", in Gross, ed. Action under Plan-
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actual participation", lb/ In both cases the bluff seems more important than the 
reality behind the façade of consultative committees and meetings. 
137. To get beyond façade democracy it is essential to develop greater recognition 
of the principle that "Effective formulation and implementation of development plans 
require genuine participation by major groups and communities". The application of 
this principle enables national planners to build an "activation base" (or "support 
"base") composed of people with the power to get action. But "genuine" participation 
means that the planners must be willing to pay a certain price, namely, that the 
plans and actions emerging from the consultative process may never be fully known 
in advance. This sharing in the power of decision-making unquestionably means cer-
tain differences in the nature of the decisions made. 
138. On the other hand, "genuine" does not mean "haphazard". In any industrializing 
society there are many people and groups who are not yet ready for a high degree of 
participation. Among these are trade unions, city governments and local community 
groups and business associations, whose leaders are overworked and whose profession-
al staffs have not yet been developed. Here the task of the development planners is 
to prepare the ground by moving from simpler and smaller issues to larger and more 
complex ones. The best way to prepare these groups is not to postpone consultation, 
but rather to use consultative arrangements as a way of educating the groups in the 
complexities of developmental processes and programmes. 
7 V Ibid. 
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VI. CENTRaL-REGIONAL-LOCaL RELATIONS 
13-9. Industrializing has always involved nation-building. In Europe, it took 
many centuries and much bloodshed before city-states, small principalities and 
feudal domains were welded together into nation-states. In Asia and Africa, the 
process of nation-building will probably be faster and less violent. But during 
the rest of this century, with the problems of localism, tribalism, communalism, 
separatism and ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural heterogeneity, it will 
be difficult, complex and costly to build nations. 
1'40. National planning itself is a major contribution to nation-building,, since 
"a national plan serves as a unifying agent of an otherwise loose and fragile 
society. „„„ Even if the economic and social goals are not realized, a plan is suc-
cessful to the extent to which it serves to mobilize the people's energies, bring 
about national planning machinery and a measure of political consensus."-¿2/ The 
creation of national planning machinery also contributes to nation-building, since 
the central and peripheral organizations and the machinery of consultation help 
bring together the diverse interests in a society. 
1A1. Thus far, however, in this discussion of national planning machinery, 
spatial considerations have not been taken into account. Nor have the organs of 
subnational government at both the regional and local levels been discussed. Yet 
no national planning machinery is capable of effective development planning unless 
it includes provision for these subnational levels. 
A. Centralization veins and decentralization arteries 
14.2. In a country threatened or torn apart by sectionalism (often reinforced 
by linguistic, ethnic or religious ties), the building of a nation obviously implies 
greater centralization of power, responsibility and authority in the central organs 
of national government. The national plan is itself a symbol of' centralization. 
The national machinery of planning creates a system of centralized decision-making. 
143. These obvious facts, however, may be seriously distorted by "either-or" 
proverbs which suggest that the machinery of government may be described in terms 
of either centralization or decentralization. These proverbs are closely related 
to the myths of central omnipotence (referred to in chapter V A) and of autonomous 
local governments, as developed by apologists for local interests fearing national 
75/ Anthony Hubert Rweyemamu, Nation-Building and the Planning Processes in 
Tanzania, unpublished doctoral dissertation. Syracuse University, 1965, 
pp. 95, 241. 
- 5 0 -
control. Then there are the "Simple Simon" centralization proverbs holding that 
modern methods of information processing necessarily lead to the centralization 
of decision-making in large organizations. 
I/A-. The subsequent discussion is necessarily tentative and preliminary. This 
is a field in which considerable new research is needed to dispel the clouds of 
obfuscation that have been thus far preventing realistic analysis by public admini-
stration experts and commentators. 
1 /£>.. Yet every practical administrator knows that in order to centralize some 
things, other things must be decentralized. "Neither centralization nor decentra-
lization are absolutes. An extreme of either one would destroy any organization. 
Not only do the two always appear together; they complement each other. The 
arteries of decentralization bring the lifeblood of responsibility and authority 
to the various members, while the veins bring it back to the center. The decen-
tralization of some functions is impossible without the centralization cf others, 
and vice versa. "76/ Hence one of the most important principles of development 
administration and planned economic development is that: "The power to achieve 
significant progress can be obtained only through some combination of centrali-
zation and decentralization". 
146. Within any single organization, whether it be a national planning agency 
or a development ministry, a ministry of finance, or an industrial development 
bank, there are three dimensions on which centralization-decentralization combi-
nations may be measured: (a) the horizontal dispersion or concentration among the 
various head office units; (b) the vertical dispersion or concentration among the 
hierarchical levels of each; and (c) the geographical dispersion or concentration 
between field offices and the other units in the organization. 
14<-7. Beyond the apparatus of national government, there are other basic ele-
ments that may enter into centralization-decentralization combinations: (a) sub-
national state governments, an important part of any federal system; (b) local 
governments below the state level; and (c) provincial governments or regional 
instrumentalities intervening between the central government and the subnational 
states. It is interesting to note that an increase in decentralization from one 
point of view, for instance, the delegation or devolution of additional authority 
to state or provincial agencies, may mean greater centralization from another 
viewpoint — in this case, that of the local governments. Similarly, more power 
by either state or local governments to do things on their own may mean an enlarge-
ment, not a diminution, of the central government's power to get things done. 
76/ B. Gross, The Managing of Organizations,, op..cit., "People-in-Organizations: 
Formal Aspects," chapter 15, p. 3&5. 
- 51 -
Indeed, while no generalizations can be made concerning the detailed intricacies 
of centralization-decentralization patterns, one cannot help but be struck by the , 
fact that effective central planning requires a vast amount of decentralization.¿¿J 
B. Governments at regional and local levels 
148. One of the heritages of colonialism in many industrializing countries has 
been a network of the subnational officials of central government. These officials, 
who are called District Commissioners, Officers or Collectors, usually had compre-
hensive formal authority in their respective geographical areas. The effort to 
preserve these roles - either through civil service officers or their replacement 
by political leaders - has been closely associated with the illusion of the single 
subnational co-ordinator. People are driven to this illusion by the growing com-
plexity of government agencies operating in every local area and the tendency for 
many of them to operate at cross purposes. Indeed, the illusion is increasingly 
popular in the United States, where new federal activities in every local area have 
become extremely complicated and where there is a strong tradition among local 
government experts of recommending the blatantly impossible. In France, it is part 
of the popular folklore surrounding the activities of the prefects. 
149. There are two simple reasons why the illusion cannot be converted into 
fact. First, in an industrializing society, the operations of national agencies 
become too complicated to be co-ordinated by the hierarchical authority of any 
official (whether appointed or elected) in a single region. The regional and local 
offices of a national water authority, tax collection office, health ministry, 
steel corporation, housing division or industrial development bank must operate in 
the light of many national considerations outside the legitimate scope of a regional 
or local officer. Indeed, in the interest of welding a nation together and over-
coming separatist influences, there is a need in many countries to follow the 
Mexican example of setting up semi-autonomous national agencies located regionally 
or locally to carry on specialized regional or local programmes. Such agencies 
can promote regional and local government by providing both a constructive example 
and healthy competition, which would hardly be feasible if they were under the 
authority of local leaders. 
15cQ. The second reason is the existence and growth of local, provincial or sub-
national state governments that cannot — and should not — be fully subordinated 
to the authority of a central government official. While such governments cannot 
77/ This is one of the great lessons of Soviet-style planning ana of the wide-
spread experimentation by the central authorities of Eastern Europe with 
many forms of administrative and market decentralization. 
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develop to the point of being self-sufficient or completely autonomous, their growth 
is both inevitable and desirable. Indeed, even in "unitary" (non-federal) nations 
whose central governments have complete formal authority over lower levels of 
government, central officials must often bargain gingerly with — and concede con- . 
siderably to — local political forces. 
151. One of the simplest, but most widely neglected, principles of government 
at the subnational level is that: "Regional and local co-ordination depends on the 
interaction of many subnational and national forces". This principle does not pre-
clude efforts to contribute to the co-ordination process by subnational officers of 
central government. It does not preclude hierarchical co-ordinating efforts by 
those in positions of higher formal authority. It recognizes that many disputes 
among government and private agencies in a given region may be settled only by 
decision on the part of those with formal hierarchical authority in the central 
government. Indeed, many difficult problems in a given region may be settled at 
times only by the active participation of a foreign government, a foreign corpora-
tion or an international lending agency. In any case, the possibilities of hier-
archical co-ordination are extremely limited. They are greater only when there are 
continuing efforts at mutual adjustment co-orainatiorú-H/ among all the many organi-
zations and groups involved in local level matters. 
15^. In this connexion, an important matter of terminology may be briefly 
mentioned. Regional and local problems of government cannot be discussed appro-
priately under the simplistic heading of "regional and local government", if this 
term is used to exclude the agencies at higher government levels. The problems of 
regional and local government are problems in relations among all agencies of 
government whose activities affect a given region or locality. The more appropriate 
term, which will probably not appear for another decade in textbooks on government, 
is "government at the regional or local level."22/ 
C. The content of subnational area planning 
153. One might think that a comprehensive framework for co-ordination in urban 
and regional local areas might be provided by subnational area planning. Unfor-
tunately, as pointed out in a recent United Nations public tion, "planning activities 
78/ The importance of co-ordination through mutual adjustment in many forms has 
been analysed by Charles E. Lindblom in his new book — of tremendous interest 
to national planners — The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 
1963). 
79/ The importance of dealing with inter-governmental relations at the local level 
is illustrated by Lyle C. Fitch, "Planning and Administration in Urban Areas," 
in the United Nations publication Administration of National Development 
Planning, op. cit., part II, chapter II. 
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at the urban level are concentrated on the physical (as opposed to the economic 
and social) aspects of planning. "1*2/ At the regional level, planning usually 
becomes still ies comprehensive, with special attention often given to certain 
large-scale development projects and even less attention to social considerations 
and the broad range of government promotional activities and operations. In both 
cases the professional city planner's fallacy of the master plan has led to com-
prehensive land-use maps. While these are supposed to be beautiful, they are not 
designed to have much connexion with the on-going activities of people and organi-
zations or with the purposes of the various structures and facilities to be built 
on the land.^i/ Accordingly, there is not much that can be learned from current 
local planning practice in the industrialized nations. If progress is to be made 
in subnational area planning, considerable innovations will be necessary in co-
operation idth some of the Western innovators who have not yet succeeded in 
breaking through the rigid conservatism of their own countries. 
154. A starting point principle for such innovation may be phrased as follows: 
"Subnational area planning should provide a comprehensive, continuing accounting of 
the state of the area as the framework for strategically-selected development 
measures". This principle reflects two of the healthier tendencies among forward-
looking urban and regional planners. The first is the conviction that there must 
be a new synthesis at the urban level of three previously separate specialities: 
physical planning, economic planning and social planning. This can be achieved 
only through the integrating power of a "social systems" approach. It requires a 
"model" of an urban (or regional) area as a loose, open man-resource system com-
posed of a great variety of individuals, families, associations and private and 
public organizations. Such a model can help planners get away from the over-
reliance on the old-fashioned "hard goods" techniques of building regulation and 
land-use maps and the equally limited number magic of linear programming and 
systems analysis in mechanical terms. It can provide the basis for a growing body 
of increasingly reliable information on the changing population, resource and 
institutional structure of an area 
80/ Ibid., para. 35 
81/ The limitations of the old-fashioned style of so-called "master planning" at 
the local level are dealt with in greater detail in Bertram M. Gross, "The 
City of Man: A Social Systems Approach," the major address at the Annual 
Conference of the American Institute of Planners, Portland, Oregon, 16 August, 
1966. 
82/ More specific suggestions concerning the contents of annual "state of the 
area reports" are provided in both Gross, "The City of Man: A Social Systems 
Approach," and Gross, The State of the Nation: Social Systems Accounting, 
op. cit. 
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155. The second tendency is the growing realization of the difference between 
comprehensive information and strategic action. The great germ of truth in the 
idea of "comprehensive planning" is the fact that only by comprehensive economic, 
social and physical indicators is it possible to come to grips with specific pro-
jects. Otherwise, second-order consequences and third-party effects cannot be 
anticipated in advance. The error In the concept of "comprehensive planning" is 
the thought that any government might be capable of marching ahead with regional 
and local development programmes on all fronts at the same time ano. with equal 
speed. The essence of strategy is selective measures at specific points. The 
value of a broad informational framework is that it allows such strategic selec-
tion to be discriminating and prescient instead of blind or myopic.§2/ 
D. Urban areas as "development dynamos" 
156. Reference has already been made (in chapter III D) to Lauchlin Currie's 
suggestion that most development economists have underestimated the benefits to 
be obtained from planned investments in housing and other urban facilities. Currie 
also points out that "all the horribly expensive and dreary phenomena of American 
urban development — towering congested centres, blighted areas, sprawling 
suburbs, individual commuting to the centre, and a tremendous investment in 
throughways, underpasses, overpasses, cloverleafs, etc., — are beginning to 
appear in countries that have not yet attained even a decent minimum standard of 
living". 84/ 
One of the reasons for such urban conditions in the industrializing 
nations — apart from the lack of urban planning models that can be adapted from 
industrialized countries — is the fallacy of non-productive urban investment. 
15'T. This fallacy represents one of the major premises in the thinking of 
many development economists. It is expressed in innumerable calculations concern-
ing the great benefits flowing from investments in industry and agriculture, as 
compared to the extremely low benefits stemming from housing and urban facilities. 
In most cases, the calculations are made entirely in terms of the more readily 
measurable direct income and output (or profits) resulting from industrial and 
agricultural investment. The calculations usually ignore the vast indirect 
benefits of urban investment in terms of (a) more and quicker employment; (b) 
the development of a modern labour force through work on construction; (c) the 
promotion of the local market for the products of consumer goods industries and 
for local building materials; and (d) the development of an urban culture that 
provides hope of advancement for the masses, freedom from the confining tradi-
tions of peasant agriculture, and centres of progress in education, the arts, the 
83/ For a detailed rebuttal of the idea that a comprehensive approach can be 
strategic and a convincing presentation of the selective nature of strategy, 
see Robert A. Anthony, Planning and Control Systems (Boston: Harvard 
Business School, 1965). 
84/ Currie, Accelerating Development, op. cit., p. 53. 
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sciences and technology. This last point is important enough to warrant a principle 
by itself: "Sustained economic and social progress requires urban areas that are 
dynamic centres of culture, education, science and technology". 
15'8. This principle does not suggest the desirability of less attention to agri-
culture or rural community development. It does suggest, however, the need for a 
break with the romantic idealization of the small village as the source of all 
good and the view of the big city as the source of all evil. The fact is that while 
the modern urban area has great potentialities for both good and evil, without it 
there is little hope of developing either industry or agriculture, the city or the 
country, as centres of government, business, finance, education, science and tech-
nology, urban areas are the essential dynamos for progress in all parts of an 
industrializing country.H2/ 
85/ For a profound humanistic analysis of the potentialities of urban areas see 
Harvey Cox, The Secular City (New York: Macmillan, 1965). 
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VII. SUMMATION 
159. Let us now bring back to the centre of attention the various principles that 
have been presented above: 
Interdependence of planning and administration 
1. The effective' planners are those involved in certain day-to-day activities 
o f gove rnme nt. 
2. All planners should recognize that economic considerations are intimately 
tied up with a large variety of non-economic variables. 
3. Effective development requires greater recognition of the need for 
Integrating Generalists. 
Implementation: Strategic guidelines 
U. The environment of all national planners is the emergence of a world 
society of increasingly interdependent nations. 
5. In a world of revolutionary, scientific and technological changes, the 
planners of accelerated economic development must always be alert to the 
potentialities of new technology. 
6. In its highest forms development planning is the art of the improbable, 
not merely the possible. 
7. The only good justification of national planning is to help serve the 
interests of people. 
Implementation: Obstacles 
8. The first obstacles to economic growth are scarcities of physical, human 
and institutional resources. 
9. Development planning is inevitably involved in various forms of open and 
hidden social conflict. 
10. Like everyone else, planners make errors in both substance and methods, 
11. The scientific basis of national planning is still extremely weak, lagging 
behind both the achievements of natural science and the intuitive wisdom 
of the best planners. 
- 57 -
Implementation: Operating principles 
12, The budgeting of government plans should be based upon an appraisal of 
(a) the direct and indirect benefits likely to be obtained from (b) 
identifiable outputs to be provided by the use of (c) realistically 
estimated inputs, 
13o Central planners should promote the formulation and review of large 
numbers of specific development projects in terms of the relevant 
technical, financial, administrative, political and cultural considera-
tions . 
14o The effective decentralization of decision-making through markets and 
price' systems requires highly developed skills in "market administra-
tion." 
15, Effective development planning requires the painstaking collection and 
wide distribution of strategic information. 
16, More effective development planning requires an increase in research and 
theory, both basic and applied, both specialized and interdisciplinary on 
planning problems and processes, 
17, Planners too must learn. 
18, Planners need more opportunities for informal and continuing dialogues 
across national, disciplinary and "position" boundaries. 
Machinery for planning 
19, Effective development planning requires a cluster of central government 
agencies with roles in providing not only staff services but also 
national' leadership, financial management and the handling of critical 
problems. 
20, Capital and people cannot be effectively used without the building, or 
adaptation, of organizations with the capacity to use them. 
21, Effective formulation and implementation both require some degree of 
private and community participation in planning processes. 
Central-regional-local relations 
22, The power to achieve significant progress can be obtained only through 
some combination of centralization and decentralization, 
23, Regional and local co-ordination depends on the interaction of many 
national and subnational forces. 
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24. Subnational area planning should provide a comprehensive continuing 
accounting of the state of the area as the framework for strategically-
selected development measures. 
25. Sustained economic and social progress requires urban areas that are 
dynamic centres of culture, science and technology. 
l6o. To those confronted with the pressing needs of daily action in guiding 
accelerated economic development, these "currently useful generalizations" will 
often prove too general to be useful. Their chief values may be to (a) promote 
deeper and more concerted thought concerning generalizations that may more 
adequately express the wisdom of successful practitioners, and (b) spark a greater 
awareness concerning the kinds of skill, judgement and wisdom that can never be 
expressed In formal, explicit propositions. 
